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The Legislative Council, which ls composed of five Senators, six Representatives,
and the presiding officers of the two houses, serves as a continuing research agency for
the legislature through the maintenance of a trained staff. Between sessions, research
activities are concentrated on the study of relatively broad problems formally proposed
by legislators, and the publication and distribution of factual reports to aid in their
solution.
During the sessions, the emphasis is on supplying legislators, on individual
request, with personal memoranda, providing them with information needed to handle
their own legislative problems. Reports and memoranda both give pertinent data in
the form of facts, figures, arguments, and alternatives, without these involving
definite recommendations for action. Fixing upon definite policies, however, is
facilitated by the facts provided and the form in which they are presented.
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December 17, 1958

Senator Ray B. Danks
Colo"rado Legislative Council
Denver 2, Colorado
_.

Dear Senator Danks:
Transmitted herewith is the report of the Legislative Council Committee
on Public Employees' Retirement appointed pursuant to Senate Joint Resolution
No. 6 (1958). This report covers the committee's study and evaluation of the
retirement program of the Public Employees' Retirement Association (P. E. R. A.)
as well as actuarial evaluations and discussion of several methods of combining
P.E.R.A. with Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance Program (O.A.S.D.I.).

"

The committee wishes to express its appreciation for the assistance
rendered to the committee by: the actuarial firm of Coates, Hurfurth and England;
Mr. F. Leighton Exel; Mr. A. C. Gabriel; Mr. Raymond J. Heath; Mr. Jack
Kennedy; and the Council staff.

Sincerely yours,

...

✓-

/s/

DC:mrl

Representative Dewey Carnahan
Chairman
Committee on Public Employees'
Retirement

FOREWORD

H.J. R. No. 42 (1957) directed the Legislative Council to study the problems
of public employee retirement with specific instructions to determine the feasibility
of combining P. E. R. A. with social security (O. A. S. D. I.).
A preliminary report was issued by the Legislative Council to the second
regular session of the 41 st General Assembly. That report concluded that it is
feasible to combine P. E. R. A. and O. A. S. D. I.
At the second regular session of the 41st General Assembly S.J. R. No. 6

was passed which instructed the Legislative Council to continue to study public
employee retirement problems with particular reference to proposing specific plans
for combining P. E. R. A. and 0, A. S. D. I.

-·

-

The Chairman of the Legislative Council appointed a committee to carry
our the provisions of this resolution. Those committee members were:
Representative Dewey Carnahan, Chairman; Representatives Luther Bean and
Gale Sellens; and Senators Hestia Wilson and James E. Donnelly.
One of the first problems that the committee faced was the necessity of
securing actuarial evaluations of alternative combination plans. Since funds were
not available to secure an independent actuarial study, arrangements were made with
the P. E. R. A. Board of Directors to have A. C. Gabriel, the P, E. R. A. actuary, to
evaluate the proposed plans. That service was provided by P. E. R. A. at a cost of
$5,475. In that connection, the P. E. R. A. board, Mr. Raymond J. Heath, Mr. Jack
Kennedy and Mr. A. C. Gabriel generously cooperated with the committee and the
staff throughout this study.
The actuarial firm of Coates, Hurfurth and England has served as an
unpaid consultant to the committee throughout the study. That firm assigned
Mr. F. Leighton Exel to work with the committee and his coonsel and guidance has
been of immeasurable value to the committee and the staff.
Harry 0. Lawson, Senior Analyst, is the Council staff member who has
had the major research responsibility for this report.

)

This report was not completed in time for the 1957-1958 Legislative Council
to review, Since a new Council has not been appointed, the interim Chairman of the
Legislative Council instructed the committee to issue its report to the General
Assembly as a committ· ee report in order that the General Assembly may have ready
access to the results of the study.

Lyle C. Kyle
Director

..

December 17, 1958
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND COMMITTBB RBCOMMBNDATIONS
Findin_£

The Public Employees Retirement Association (P;B. R. A.) provides retirement
coverage for some 27,000 Colorado employees in public service. These include 11,288
state employees, 14,489 schpol employees, 1, 129 municipal employees, and 77 judges.
Three other retirement systems provide coverage for some of Colorado's public employees.
The City and County of Denver school district employees have their own retirement
system, as do the employees of the Denver Water Board. The faculty of the University of
Colorado is covered by the Teachers' Annuity Insurance Association. Both the Denver
Water Board employees and the University of Colorado faculty have combined their
retirement systems with social security (0. A. S. D. I.). County employees and the
majority of municipal employees are covered by 0. A. S. D. I. only.

P. B. R. A. Benefits
From the average employee's point of view, P. E • R. A. is a very satisfactory
retirement plan. With 20 years' service at age 65, he receives a retirement annuity equal
to one-half of his highest average salary for any consecutive five of the last ten years of
service. Early retirement is allowed for 35 years' service at any age, 30 years' service
at age 55 (35 years for school employees), and 20 years' service at age 60. Upon early
retirement, an employee is eligible for an annuity equal to one-half his final average
salary or $300 per month, whichever is less.
Additional benefits under P. E. R. A. include disability retirement, survivorship
benefits, death benefits, and deferred annuities. An employee with five years of P. B. R. A. covered service is entitled to one-half of his monthly salary if he becomes permanently
disabled on the job. If he has 15 years of service, he is entitled to a full retirement
annuity if he has a non-employment permanent disability.
Survivorship benefits are provided for the spouse and children of a deceased member
who has five years of covered service. Prior to completing his five years of service, he
may choose to avail himself of group insurance coverage at a nominal monthly charge. In
the event that a member dies before he is eligible either for retirement or for survivorship
benefits, his beneficiary receives a lump sum refund of the contributions he has made to
P. B. R. A. If he dies after he is eligible for retirement, his beneficiary will receive a
reduced monthly annuity for the remainer of his or her life.
Members leaving P. E. R. A. -covered service after five years or more may leave
their retirement deposits in the sy.stern until age 65, at which time they will receive a
deferred annuity based on 2. 5 per cent of final average salary multiplied by the number of
years of covered service, not to exceed 20.

V

Colorado State Patrol employees and the judges who are members of the P. B. R. A,
judges' division have slightly different annuity benefit formulae, but are eligible for all
other P. B. R. A. benefits.

P. B. R.A. members get a very high return per dollar of contribution, and the rate
of contribution is not excessive. A 11 P. B. R.A. members except the state highway patrol
contribute six per cent of salary. Because of more costly benefits, members of the state
highway patrol contribute at a seven per cent rate. The employer also contributes at a
six per cent rate for all members except the state highway patrol and judges. The
employer contributes seven per cent for highway patrol members and 12 per cent for
Judges, again because of more costly annuity benefits.

Whlle P. B. R. A. generally is a good retirement system from the employee's point
of view, such may not be the case from the employer's standpoint, or for all employees.
Careful consideration should be given to the costs of the P. E. R. A. program and the
relative portions borne by employer and employee. Bvaluation should be made of the
career service aspects of P. E. R. A. and to the way it meets or fails to meet the needs of
certain categories of employees. (It is extremely difficult to present a simplified picture
of the costs and other factors pertaining to a retirement system. The general statements
made below are covered in detail in the body of the report.)
Costs and Contributions

P. B. R.,A. is a joint-contributory retirement plan, operating on an actuarial reserve
basis. Contributions are made by both employer and employee as service ls rendered.
Contribution rates are often mistakenly equated with the actual cost of a retirement plan.
The employee may assume that because both he and the employer contribute at the same
rate, he ls paying 50 per cent of the cost of his retirement annuity. The employer may
also think that he is contributing 50 per cent of the cost of retirement or that his contributions are covering his entire costs, whatever proportion of the total this cost might be.

Actually, an employee's contributions to P. B. R. A. are more likely to constitute
20 ~o 30 per cent of the value of his retirement annuity. An employee who has a final
average salary of $4, 800, with 20 years of service at age 65, contributes approximately
27 per cent of the value of his final annuity. This proportion includes the interest earned
oil his contributions. An employee with the same final average salary who retires at age 60
with 20 years' service contributes approximately 22 per cent of the value of his retirement
annuity. If an employee with the same final average salary retires at age 55 with 30 years'
service, he contributes approximately 31 per cent of his final annuity. These proportions
are based on the ass:umptions that: I) the employee receives gradual salary increases
throughout the period of employment; and 2) the employee contributes at the same rate
throughout the period of employment.

If employees have large salary increases during the last ten years of service, and/or
contribute at a lesser rate during the period of significantly lower salary, the proportion

vi
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contributed of final annuities is less. These conditions reduce the proportion of the
retirement $nnuity financed by employees, because these annuities are based on final
average salaries resulting from the large salary increases and/or ·because the retirement
annuities are· based on the larger contribution rate, regardless of the number of years
coiltributlons may have been made into the retirement fund at a lesser rate.
Changes in the contribution rate and the sizable increase in• salaries since World
War JI have had an effect on the proportion of retirement annuities financed through
contributions to P. B. R. A ~ by state, school, and municipal employees - - some of whom
have already retired. As of the end of the 1958 fiscal year, 88. 6 per cent of the liabilities
for retired or deceased state employees were employer financed. This proportion was
slightly less for the school and municipal divisions . Prior to World War JI, employees
. cpntributed at a 3. 5 per cent rate. That rate was increased to five per cent in 1949 and to
six per cent as of July I, 1958.
Another significant factor in the small proportion of state employee contributions was
~e prior service credit without back payment granted to those state employees with a considerable number of years of service before the retirement system was established in 1931.
Prior service credits were not granted members of the school and municipal divisions.
Even though the employer is paying the major portion of ·r etirement benefits, the
state has contributed fewer dollars to P. E. R. A. since its inception than have state employees.
State employees have contributed $18. 5 million and the state as employer slightly' in excess
of $17 million. During the first five years of the plan, the state made no contributions at
all. Between 1936 and 1946, the state's annual contributions varied from token payments to
a sum almost equal to that contributed by employees. Since 1946, the state's share has been
approximately equal to employees' contributions. In both the school and municipal divisions,
the employer rate of contribution has been approximately the same as the employees'.
Financing P. E. R. A. Benefits
At the present time there are unfunded accrued liabilities of $35 million in the state
division of P.E.R.A., almost $15 million in the school division, and slightly more than·
$.5 million in the municipal fund. These liabilities are computed by the system's actuary
and are based on the difference between assets on hand and the liabilities resulting from
benefits already earned by present members, both active and retired. These liabilities
do not apply to future credits to be earned by present and new employees, as it is assumed
that these will be met by future employer-employee contributions and the investment of
these contributions •
In the state division the unfunded accrued liability exists because of: 1) the failure

of the state to contribute in the past for prior service credits; 2) the failure of the state
in the past to contribute at a rate which would meet its share of current financing; 3) the
relatively recent salary increases which have raised the level of retirement annuities,
which are based on final average salary; 4) the increased life expectancies of P. E. R.A.
annuitants; and 5) the increase in the maximum annuity from $200 per month to $300 per
month for those members retiring prior to age 65. Of these five the most impartant are
1) and 3).
vii

This unfunded accrued liability, in a sense, is similar to the national debt, in that
it becomes payable over a period of years, rather than all at once. As long as the retirement system continues, current income can be used to fund these liabilities as they become
due. Future unfunded accrued liabilities resulting from the use of current income to cover
past unfunded accrued liabilities, in turn, may also be financed in the same way.
To keep this liability from continuing to grow, it is necessary to meet the interest on
this amount. The liability represents a deficit in assets which cannot be invested. If the
employer contributes at a rate high enough to cover the interest Jnst because of the lack of
these funds to invest, the unfunded liability will not increase, unless there is a continued
sizable increase in salaries.
Except for prior service credits, the unfunded accrued liability has grown in the
school and municipal divisions for the same reasons as the state division.
At present the state, school, and municipal employers are contributing at a rate of
According to the calculations made by the system's actuary, the state should
be contributing at a rate of 6. 7 per cent and the schools at a rate of 6.52 per cent to
finance completely the interest on the unfunded liabilities. The current six per cent rate
is sufficient not only to pay the interest but to amortize the unfunded liability in the
municipal division in 15 years. Should a decision be made to amortize the unfunded
liabilities in the state and school divisions, over a 35-year period, the state would have to
contribute at a rate of 7. 98 per cent and the schools, 6. 99 per cent. If there were no
further increases in the unfunded liability, the state's contribution rate in 1994 would fall
to 4. 94 per cent and the schools' to 5. 87 per cent - the 1994 date corresponding to the end
of the amortization period.

ape per cent.

Coverage Problems Under P. E. R. A.
All full-time employees of the state and of those political subdivisions participating
in the P. B. R. A program, with few exceptions, are required to be members of P. E. R. A.
For a variety of reasons, some of these employees are not covered, and there is no legal
requirement that coverage be provided for temporary and/or part-time emplnyees. The
P. E. R. A. retirement board has appeared reluctant to make an issue of requiring eligible
employees to participate in the retirement program, even though it has the authority to do
so; however, there are no penalties provided by law which may be imposed upon agencies
or employees for not joining.
In addition to those employees of various state agencies and political subdivisions who
should be covered, but are not, there are approximately 5,000 state employees who are
actually temporary, part-time, or exempt from P.B.R.A. coverage. These employees are
provided with no retirement coverage at all while in the employ of the state. The school and
municipal divisions also have some temporary and part-time employees without retirement
coverage, although the problem is not as extensive as in the state division.

viii

The officials and employees of three member cities of the municipal division have
indicated a desire to withdraw from P. B. R. A. and to substitute O. A. S. D. I. coverage
:Instead. These cities, Arvada, Fort Morgan, and Gunnison, feel that they do not have
care er services, so that employees do not stay in service long enough to retire, and
their employees object to six per cent deductions from their salaries.
Older Employees and P. E. R. A.
Another problem of sqme importance is that of older employees who reach age 65 or
more without sufficient years of service to provide them with more than a small retirement
benefit under P. B. R. A. This is especially a problem in the school division, where, as of
June 30, 1958, a total of 530 employees over the age of 59 had four years of service or less.
This group comprises one-third of the school division membership in this age category.
Almost 20 per cent of all state members over 59 years of age fall in this group, as do 25
per cent of the municipal division membership.
Most of these employees have entered public service after their 55th birthdays, and
it can be argued that the employer has no obligation to provide retirement benefits beyond

those which accrue from the short period of public service. It should be remembered,.
however, that many of these employees have had 0. A. S. D. I. coverage prior to entering
P. B. R. A. -covered employment. During the years in which they work in P. B. R. A. covered employment, no contributions are made to O. A. S. D. I., consequently their salary
credits under O.A.S.D.I. are reduced. As a result, these employees receive a small
retirement benefit from each source, the total of which may be less than that provided by
the Colorado Old Age Pension .

•

Many of these employees are in the low salary brackets and hired at an advanced age
to perform custodial work or other unskilled services. If such employees have only small
benefits from both O. A. S. D. I. and P. E. R. A. and no other income, the only alternatives
are to go on working or to go on the old age pension.
Because of the questionable efficiency of these older employees as they approach 70,
it is possible that the state and other public employers may consider mandatory retirement
as a means of removing older, less efficient workers from public service. In taking such
a step, retirement provisions for these older workers should be carefully examined to see
if improvements can be made which .would be neither too costly, nor unfair to the longterm career service employee.
P. B. R. A. as a Career Service Retirement Plan

The normal working career is usually considered as 30 years or more, yet the
maximum P. B. R. A. retirement benefits are based on 20 years' service at age 65.
Bmployees who work more years for the state are penalized, because they continue to pay
into P. E. R. A. without receiving any increase in benefits. The present plan also encourages
employees to retire from P. E. R.A. -covered employment at an early enough age to acquire
O. A. S. D. I. benefits or retirement benefits in another plan through subsequent employment.

ix

P. B. R. A. is especially advantageous to the employee who enters covered.public.
service at age 40 or later, since he will receive the same retirement benefit as
the employee who enters covered public service at age 25 or 30. For these
reasons, P. B. R. A. should be re-examined in light of public employment personnel
practices, to see whether modifications may be needed in keeping with the concepts
of career service.
O. A. S. D. I. Coverage for Public BmploY.:ees
Amendments to the Social Security Act since 1950 have extended eligibility
for O. A. S. D. I. coverage to public employees. Between 1950 and 1954 such coverage was available only for public employees who were not already members, or
eligible to be members, of a public employees' retirement program. Under these
provisions, Colorado passed legislation to make O. A. s. D. I. coverage available
to employees of political subdivisions who were not already covered by a public
employee retirement program.
Further changes in the Social Security Act in 1954 and 1956 extended
coverage to those public employees covered by a -retirement system, but only upon
a favorable referendum of such employees. Under these amendments it is possible
to divide a public employees' retirement system into several groups for referenda
purposes. In Colorado these groups would include state employees, each institu•
tlon. of higher education, school districts (either as a group or by district), and
municipalities (either as a group or by city). Police and firemen (and by implication, the state patrol) would be excluded from such referenda unless express
permission is given the state for their inclusion through further amendment to the
Social Security Act.
The 1956 amendments made it possible for specifically designated states

to set up two-part retirement systems. One part would include those employees
who desired to remain under the old plan, and the other .those employees who
·

wished to have their retirement system combined with O. A. s. D. I. 'Ibe same subgroups could be established for referenda purposes, as is the case in the states ·
without a two-part retirement system. States have been added to the two-part
list upon their own initiative. State legislative and/or executive request has been
sufficient to amend the Social Security Act to add states to the list.

P»esent O. A. S. D. I. Benefits and Contribution Rates
Retirement benefits under 0. A. S. D. I. currently range between a minimum

of $33 and a maximmn of $127, depending upon average monthly wage. An additional
benefit is payable to a retlrant•s wife. This spouse's benefit may be.equal to onehalf the hueband's primary insurance benefit.

Survivorship benefits for the wife and family of a ~Uy insured individual
are payable up to a maximum of $254 per month, depending on the number of
children under age 18 and the averag"e salary of the person insured. Dlsability
benefits are also payable in an amount equal to the primary insurance benefit for
disabled fully insured individuals who have attained their 50th birthdays and who
have submitted proper proof. of such disability.
Contribution rates for 0. A. S. D. I. are currently 2. 5 per cent of the
first $4,800 of annual.salary for both employer and employee. These rates are
scheduled to increase to three per cent in 1960, 3.5 per cent in 1963, four per
cent in 1966, and 4.5 per cent in 1969. '
Back- Dating of O. A. S. D. I. Coverage
For the purposes of computing O. A. S. D. I. retirement benefits a covered
employee's salary is averaged from January 1, 1951, until the time of his retirement. This average includes only that portion of annual salary upon which
O. A. S. D. I. contributions are made. Therefore, an employee is credited with a
maximum of $4, 800 in any one year and with no salary in years in which the
employee made no contributions to 0. A. S. D. I.; however, the five lowest years
may he dropped out in making these computations.

•

It was recognized that many public employees covered by a retirement
system probably would not have O. A. S. D. I. coverage from January 1, 1951, until
the date when the system was combined with O. A. S. D. I. Since the five lowest
years may be dropped out in computing O. A. S. D. I. benefits, provision has been
made to back-date O. A. S. D. I. coverage to January I, 11956, for public employees
who chose to combine the systems.
To include back-dating, the agreement providing for O. A. S. D. I. coverage
must be dated no later than December 31, 1959. In' other words, unless such an
agreement is signed within the specified time, maximum O. A. S. D. I. benefits
commensurate with salary cannot be provided. While this time period was extended
in 1957, Congress may show reluctance to extend' it any further.
Methods of Combining O. A. S. D. I. with a Public Employees' Retirement System
There are three basic ways in which 0. A. S. D. I. may be merged with a
public employees' retirement system.
Supplementation - 0. A. S. D. I. benefits are added to the present retirement system; the present benefits are maintained in full measure without change.
The benefits and contribution rates of the present system are continued at the
existing level, with O. A. S. D. I. benefits and conbillatlioBs added.
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Offset- The retirement plan is fused with 0. A. S. D. I. so that present
retirement benefits would be directly offset by social security benefits. A complete
merging of benefits and contributions is generally achieved. Consequently, as
O. A. S. D. I. benefits and contribution rates increase, the retirement plan benefits
and contribution rates decrease in the same proportion.
Coordination - O. A. S. D. I. is combined with an adjusted retirement plan.
The present retirement plan would be revised downward with respect to benefits
and contributions, although not necessarily in the same amount as O. A. S. D. I.
benefits and contribution rates. For the present, contribution rates would be
slightly higher than the system before combination. As 0. A. S. D. I. rates increase,
contribution rates would increase because there would be no downward revision in
the present system either in rates or benefits.
Specific Proposals to Combine P. E. R. A. and 0. A. S. D. I.
Several proposals for combining P. E. R. A. and O. A. S. D. I. were actuarially evaluated. These proposals included: I) full supplementation, the most
expensive method of combination; 2) full offset, the least expensive method of
combination; 3) a coordinated plan in which P. E. R. A. benefits are reduced at
age 65; with the effect that the total benefit is slightly higher than under P.E.R.A.
alone; and 4) a new retirement plan based on 30 years of service and coordinated
with 0. A. S. D. I.

In presenting these proposals for evaluation it was specified that no present
employee should receive less under a combination plan than he would receive under
P. E. R. A.
Under the full supplementation plan, present P. E. R. A. benefits and contribution rates would be maj.ntained, and O. A. S. D. I. benefits and contributions
would be added. An employee who retired prior to age 65 would receive the same
benefit he would have received under P. E. R.A. Upon reaching age 65, O.A.S.D.I.
benefits would be added.
The offset plan is generally similar to P. E. R. A. with three exceptions:
I) O.A.S.D.I. survivorship benefits would replace P.E.R.A. survivorship
benefits if higher; 2) O. A. S. D. I. disability benefits would be added to P. E. R. A.
disability benefits; and 3) benefits would be the same as P. E. R. A. for retirement
before age 65. At age 65, P. E. R. A. benefits would be reduced by the amount of
the O. A. S. D. I. primary insurance benefit. Eligibility for the O. A. S. D. I. spouse's
benefit would have no effect on the amount of the P. E. R. A. benefit to be received at
age 65.
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The coordinated plan is also similar to P. E. R. A. except that O. A. S. D. I.
survivorship benefits would be substituted for P. E. R. A. survivorship benefits.
Disability benefits would be provided by both plans. Retirement benefits prior to
age 65 would be computed in the same way as P. E. R. A. at present. At age 65,
P. B. R. A. benefits would be computed according to the following formula : one per
cent of the first $4, 800 of final average salary times the number of years of
service not to exceed 20 plus 2. 5 per cent of the amount of final average salary
above $4, 800 times the years of service not to exceed 20 plus the 0. A. S. D. I.
primary insurance benefit. The 0. A. S. D. I. spouse's benefit, if payable, would
be additional.
The new retirement plan is based on a career concept of 30 years' service
and retirement at age 65. The benefit formula was devised to blend in with the
O. A. S. D. I. primary benefit. Retirement benefits are computed according to the
following formula at age 65: . 67 per cent of the first $4,800 of final average
salary times years of service, with no limit plus I. 67 per cent of final average
salary above $4,800 times years of service, with no limit plus O. A. S. D. I. primary
benefit. The 0. A. S. D. I. spouse's benefit, if payable, would be additional. Retire•
ment before age 65 is possible, but would be discouraged through the provision that
the annuity paid for early retirement would be the actuarial equivalent of the same
annuity at age 65. For example, an employee retiring at age 60 would receive a
monthly benefit of approximately two-thirds of what he would have received for the
same amount of service at age 65.
Other benefits of the new retirement plan would be similar to P. B. R. A,
except that O. A. S. D. I. survivorship benefits would be substituted for similar
benefits under P. E. R. A.
The evaluations for the offset anp coordinated plans were made in two ways.
First, it was assumed that credits already earned for service under P.B.R.A.
would be converted to the combined plan formula. Second, it was ·assumed that
credits already earned for service under P.B.R.A. would be frozen--that ia, full
credit would be given under the P. E. R. A. formula, with the new formula to apply
only to service under the new plan. (The offset and coordinated plans with earned
credits frozen are naturally more expensive than the offset and coordinated plan■
with no "frozen" e.a rned credits.)
Contribution Rates, Costs, and Benefits
The contribution rates and costs for all of the combined plans will be
higher than current P. E. R. A. rates, eventually, if not at present. The scheduled
rate increases for O. A. S. D. I. will increase the contribution rates over existing
rates for all plans, including offset. Employee contribution rates and benefits under
each plan are the same for the state, school, and municipal divisions. Employer
contribution rates for each plan vary somewhat from division to division.
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Employee contribution rates on the first $4,800 of salary for the various
combination plans would vary in 1959 from five per cent (coordination) to 8. 5 per
cent (full supplementation). The employee contribution rate on the first $4,800
of salary for the new retirement plan and the offset plan in 1959 wruld be six per
cent, the same as P. E. R. A. Under all combination plans, employees would contribute at a rate of six per cent on the portion of annual salary above $4,800.
The employee contribution rate on the first $4,800 of salary would increase as
O. A. S. D. I. contribution rates increase, for all combination plans except offset.
By 1969, these rates would be seven per cent for the coordinated plan, 7 .5 per cent
for the new retirement plan, and 10. 5 per cent for full supplementation. These
employee contribution rates would be the same for members of all P. E. R. A.
divisions.
Employer contribution rates would vary from division to division. In 1959,
the state would contribute at the following rates: full supplementation, 9 .11 per
cent; coordination, 6. 3 per cent or 6. 9 per cent ( depending on whether eamed
credits are frozen); new retirement plan, 5. 62 per cent; and offset, 5 .15 per cent
or 6. 03 per cent (depending on whether earned credits are frozen). These rates
include the amount needed to meet the interest on the unfunded liability and are
comparable to the 6. 7 per cent rate needed for P. E. R. A. to meet the interest on
the unfunded liability.
The employer's contribution rates would also increase as O. A. S. D. I.
contribution rates increased. In 1969, the state would contribute at the following
rates: full supplementation, 10. 9 per cent; coordination, 8. 09 per cent or 8. 69
per cent (depending on whether earned credits are frozen); new retirement plan,
7 .41 per cent; and offset, 7.34 per cent or 8.22 per cent (depending on whether
earned credits are frozen). These rates are also based on meeting the interest on
the unfunded liability, and are comparable to the 6. 7 per cent employer contribution
rate for P.E.R.A. The employer rates for the school and municipal divisions are
shown in Chapter III of the repart. Also shown in Chapter III are the employer
contribution rates if the unfunded liability were amortized over a 35-year period.
For employees with 20 years' service at age 65, annuity benefits under
the offset plan would be the same as those under P. E. R. A. , except that the
O.A.S.D.I. spouse's benefit, if payable, would be added. Under full supplementation, all O.A.S.D,I. retirement benefits would be added to P.E.R.A. benefits.
The coordinated plan would provide annuity benefits slightly in excess of P. E. R. A.' s
at present, and the spause's benefit, if payable, would be added. Under the new
retirement plan employees at age 65 with 20 years' service would receive lower
benefits than under P. E • R • A. However, after 25 years' service in the low salary
brackets and 30 years' service in all other salary brackets, except the highest,
benefits under the new retirement plan would be approximately the same or slightly
higher than under P. E. R. A. Additional credits would be given for service in excess
of 30 years. The spouse's benefit, if payable, would be in addition to the annuities
discussed above.
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For less than 20 years' service at age 65, the annuity benefits would be
proportional to those shown above. Bmployees who retired prior to age 65 under
all combination plans, except the new retirement plan, would receive the annuity
similar to the one now provided under P. B. R. A. Under the new retirement plan,
an employee who retired prior to age 65 would receive a reduced annuity based on
the amount he v.uuld have received had he retired at age 65 with the same amount
of service. (Chapter III presents a detailed discussion, with appropriate tables,
of the retirement annuity benefits under the several combination plans at different
salary levels and varying periods of service. )
P. B. R. A. and Combination Pl.ans~ Some Considerations
No clear-cut case can be made for combining or not combining P. B. R.. A.
and O. A. S. D. I. There are general advantages which should be considered, as
well as good points and drawbacks to each of the proposed combination plans.
Combination may or may not be desirable for a specific employee, depending on
his age, years of service, marital status, salary, sex, and career aspirations.

In general. a combined plan will not be looked upon too favorably by
employees who plan to retire before age 65, especially those who plan to work
elsewhere in O. A • s. D. I. covered employment. Employees in the higher salary
brackets and women whose husbands are working in O. A. S. D. I. -covered employment also may see little desirability in a combination plan.
Combination with O. A. S. D. I. would be most advantageous to older
employees nearing age 65, mjirried male employees who expect to qualify for the
spouse's benefit, older employees who begin their state or local government
service after a number of years of 0. A. S. D. I. coverage, younger workers who
are still more or less transient, and employees in the lower salary brackets.
Originally, survivorship benefits and continuity of retirement coverage
for non-career employees were among the reasons that combination of O. A. S. D. I.
and .P. E. R. A. was advocated. The addition of survivorship benefits to P. E. R. A.
has given O. A. S. D. I. little advantage in this respect. The addition of deferred
annuities to P. E. R. A. minimizes the need of retirement coverage for transient
employees, although the value of deferred annuities is questionable for younger
employees with families, who may not be able to afford deferring a return on
their contributions until age 65. Combination with O. A. S. D. I. is also looked upon
favorably because of the spouse's benefit.
O.A.S.D.I. is designed to provide minimum retirement standards. Other
retirement systems usually are designed to attract career employees whose final
average salaries are considered a measure of their worth and upon which retirement benefits are usually based. It is argued that a combination of the two
provides both minimum and maximum retirement limits. Some proponents argue
that all employees probably will be covered by O. A. S. D. I. eventually, so that
Colorado should take this step for its public employees now at the most advantageous
; time, while coverage may be back-dated to January I, 1956, thus insuring present
employees no loss in 0. A. S. D. I. benefits.
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On the other hand, it is pointed out that all combination plans are more
costly than P. E. R. A. Some of the present P. E. R. A. provisions are either
incompatible with O. A. S. D. I. or duplicate benefits. Retirement before 65 and·
ti~ferred annuities do not blend in too well with 0. A:S. D. I. The P. E. R. A.
efstem also provides survivorship benefits similar to those of 0. A. S. D. I., as
w~ll as superior disability benefits.
The advantages and disadvantages of P. E. R. A. have already been discussed.
Furl •upplementation provides liberal benefits and is not incompatible with the
pres~t P. E. R. A. program. The basic objection to full supplementation is its cost
and h~ll contribution rate by both employer and employee.
Offset is the least expensive of the combination plans and provides the
avera~ etnployee with the same benefits he would receive under P. E. R. A., plus
the spaqae's benefit, if payable. The main objections to offset are: 1) P. E. R. A.
would be closely integrated with 0. A. S. D. I. to the extent that changes in 0. A.S. D. I.
changes in P. E. R. A.; 2) upward revisions in O. A. S, D. I. benefits
would
would not reflect in increased employee benefits, because P. E. R. A. benefits
would be tletluced proportionately; and 3) except for older workers and continuous
minimum boverage for transient workers, none of the existing retirement problems
are corrected.

cause

The coordinated plan retains all of P. E. R. A. 's features, which may or
may not be ~esirable. The benefits are slightly in excess of P. E. R. A. 's, but also
cost more. Adoption of this plan would not provide solutions to all of the present
problems under P. E. R. A.
The new retirement plan, based on 30 years' service at age 65, places a
greater propartion of the total cost on the employee (approximately 45 per cent)
and discourages early retirement. Transient employees and older employees
would benefit froJn O. A • S. D. I. coverage.
The 11:ew retirement plan gives the employer the oppartunity to correct
any existing dissatisfactions with P. E. R. A. Present employees would not have a
voice indetermining whether the plan should be set up, because the system can
be established for all future employees; however, present employees could
transfer, if they ~o desired. Career service is recognized through the 30-year
base and the granting of additional credit for years of service over 30, with no
limit. The new retirement plan costs would be in excess of P. E, R. A. costs,
but less than those under any other combined plan except offset.
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Recommendations

The Legislative Council Committee on Public Employees' Retirement has
reviewed the existing retirement system and the specific plans for combining
P'. B, R. A. and O. A. S. D. I, The committee recommends against consideration by
the General Assembly of f~ll supplementation, off set, and coordination as methods
of combining P. B. R. A. and O. A. S. D. I. Full supplementation is not favored
because of the extremely high cost to both employer and employee. Offset is
opposed because the degree of integration required with 0. A. S. D. I. would make
P. B. R. A. dependent upon policy changes made in Washington; the cost and benefits
of the P. B. R. A. portion of an offset plan \\0 uld be reduced each time a change was
made in social security. The coordinated plan overcomes some of the objections
to both full supplementation and offset; however, the committee does not believe
tnat the shortcomings of the existing retirement system could be corrected by this
type of combination.
A referendum of employees would be necessary in the event that any of
There has been no inclination on the part
of the P. E. R. A. legislative committee to support a combination plan. In fact,
this group has opposed combination in the past and is continuing to voice opposition.
these plans were considered desirable.

The failure of the P. E. R. A. legislative committee to support combination
makes it dubious that a referendum would be successful. It would be possible,
however, under any of these proposals to have Colorado designated as a state with
a two-part retirement system. If this were done, those employees who wanted
combination could get it y.rithout affecting those who want to retain P. B. R. A. as it
is. Yet, the committee cannot recommend any of the above mentioned combination plans, even if a two-part retirement system were established.
The elimination of these combination plans leaves two alternatives for the
General Assembly if it is deemed desirable to improve the retirement program for
public employees. Either P. E. R. A. can be changed, or a new retirement plan may
be established, which would combine a modified P. E. R. A. plan with O. A. S. D. I.
The resolution directing this study called for a continued study of the
problem of retirement for Colorado public employees. Consequently, your
committee has reviewed the two alternative methods for improving the retirement
program in light of the problems that are present in the existing retirement
pr9gram.
hnproving P. B • R. A.
I) Financing of the interest and/or the amortization of present accrued
unfunded liabilities could be handled under the existing retirement program. Solving
this problem would require an increase in either the employee's or: the employer's
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contribution rate, or both, to at least pay the interest on the unfunded liability aµd
perhaps that rate should be increased sufficiently to amortize the unfunded liability
over a 35-year period.
2) The fact that the employer is currently paying 70 to 75 per cent of
each retirement annuity cannot be changed as long as 20 years is used as a service
career base and as long as equal six per cent contribution rates are maintained.
Your committee is not saying that the employer's financing of 70 to 75 per cent of
each annuity is either good or bad.
3) The problem attached to the lack of retirement coverage for temparary,
part-time, and some full-time employees can be solved without combining with
O. A. S. D. I. Those employees falling in the above categories could be covered by
0. A. s. D. I. alone, if they are not eligible for P. E. R. A. A tightening of the
eligibility requirements in P. E. R. A., with penalties for failure to comply, could
solve the lack of coverage for some full-time employees.
4) The three member cities whose officials and employees want to withdraw from P. B. R. A. presents some problems. .These problems cannot be solved
to the satisfaction of the cities under the existing P. E. R. A. program. These cities
would have to be deemed separate retirement systems for purposes of combining
with 0. A. S. D. I. and then later given the opportunity to drop P. E. R. A. coverage.
If this procedure is followed there may be questions raised by the employees
regarding impairment of benefits already earned under P. E. R. A.
5) The fact that some employees enter service at an advanced age and
consequently cannot secure sufficient coverage for a full annuity is a problem that
cannot be solved and perhaps shouldn't be solved under P. E. R. A. Employment
policies perhaps should be reviewed in light of this problem, both as to the hiring
and retention of older employees.
6) The fact that P. E. R. A. retirement benefits are based on a career
concept of 20 years can be changed by legislative action for all future employees.
Combine 0. A. S. D. I. and P. E. R. A. in a New System
1) Combining P. E. R. A. with 0. A. S. D. I. will not obviate the necessity
for increasing the employer's contribution rate to pay the interest on the unfunded
liability and/or to amortize that unfunded liability.
2) A combination of the two retirement programs based on a 30 year
concept would result in the employer paying approximately 55 to 60 per cent of each
annuity as opposed to the 70 to 75 per cent relationship that now exists.

xviii

3J There would be no particular advantage of a combination plan to take
care of those employees (part-time, temporary and some full-time) who are not
now covered by P. E. R.A., except for those part-time or temporary employees who
later become full-time permanent employees. In these cases a combination plon
would _provide continuity in coverage. 111ese employees could be covered by
O. A. S. D. I. alone under the present system or under a combination plan.

4) The only way that the three member cities of P. E. R. A. can get out of
P. E. R. A. and under 0. A. S. D. I. is through a combination plan. First the employees
of these cities must come under a combination plan and then later vote to discontinue
the P. E. R. A. portion of the retirement program.
5) For those current employees who enter P. E. R. A. -covered service at
an advanced age, a combination plan would be of considerable advantage.
6) The combination plan offers a new career concept of 30 years' service
with recognition of additional years beyond 30 as opposed to the existing 20-ycar
base for maximum benefits.
Your committee makes the following recommendations:
I) establish the new retirement system combining O. A. S. D. I. with
P. E. R. A. with a 30-year career base as detailed in this report;
2) cover all part-time and temporary employees with social security alone;
3) deem the following as separate retirement systems: a) State Division;
b) Highway Patro];l c) Judges' Division; d) School Division; e) the cities of
Colorado Springs, Pueblo, Arvada, Gunnison, Fort Morgan, Wray, Alamosa, and
Boulder; and f) each institution of higher education;
4) memorialize Congress to add Colorado to the list of states authorized
to have a split retirement system;
5) establish the combination plan for all new employees and then permit
all current employees to choose individually the plan to which they want to belong;
6) back-date social security coverage to January 1, 1956 for those
current employees who choose to transfer to the new system and finance both the
employee and employer back-date payments from the employees' contributions,
which would follow them to the new system, and credit the employees' accounts for
the amount paid on behalf of the employer; and

I. The Highway Patrol must be excluded from the referendum under the provisions
of Section 218 of the Social Security Act. This would allow the patrol to retain
its present retirement program.
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7) legislation should be passed by the General Assembly to permit the
employees of the cities of Arvada, Gunnison, and Fort Morgan and other member
cities so desiring to drop P. E. R. A. coverage, by employee referenda, after the
combination plan has been adopted in those cities •

.

Alternative Propqsals
1f the General As~embly decides against establishing a new retirement
system, as suggested ·1:above, your committee recommends that the following steps
be taken to improve the existing retirement program:

I) the employers' and/or the employees' contribution to P. E. R. A. should
be increased to at least pay the interest on the unfunded accrued liability;
2) social security coverage should be provided for all part-time and
temporary. employees not now covered by P. B. R. A. or eligible to be cowered by
P. B. R. A.;
3) Congress should be memoralized to add Colorado to the list of states
permitted to have split retirement systems in order that Arvada, Gunnison, and
Fort Mprgan could obtain O. A. S. D. I. coverage eventually; and
4) legislation should be passed by the General Assembly to permit the
employe~s of the cities of Arvada, Gunnison, and Fort Morgan and any other
member
. cities to drop P. E. R. A. coverage, by employee referenda, after the
combination plan has been adopted in these cities.
~
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PUBLIC EMPLOn,'ES' RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION

Retirement coverage for maey public employees in Colorado is provided through
the Public Employees' Retirement Association~ Several categories of public employees
are included under this statutory retire~nt program,1 which is divided into the
following divisions: state employees, school district employees, municipal employees,
and judges. As of June 30, 1958, the state division had 11,288 members; the school
division 14,489; the municipal division, 1,129; and the judge's division, 77.

-,.,

The Colorado State Employees' Retirement Association was established by statute
in 1931. In 1943, coverage was extended by law to include the employees of any
school district, any city and county, and any municipality; however, each of these
political subdivisions could refuse to avai~ itself of such coverage. At the same
time, the State Employees' Retirement Association was renamed the Public Employees'
Retirement Association (P.E.R.A.). Further statute changes in 1949 and 1951 added
county and district health department employees and public housing authority employees
to the list of those eligible for coverage under the municipal division of P.E.R.A.
The 1951 legislation also made coverage for school employees mandatory except for
those school districts which had set up a local retirement system. Coverage for
the judiciary, originally provided only for supreme court judges, was extended by
legislation in 1949, 1951, ar:rl 1952, and now includes judges of the Supreme Court,
district courts, county courts, and juvenile courts.
All permanent, full-time state employees are required by law to be members of
the state division P.E.R.A., with the following exceptions: elected state officials,
including members of the General Assembly; district and supreme court judges, who
have a separate retirement plan; district attorneys; county commissioners; and the
presidents, deans, professors, and instructors in state educational institutions
which have an established retirement or annuity plan for such employees. The latter
exception applies specificalJy to the faculty of the University of Colorado, which
is covered for retirement purposes by the Teacher's Insurance Annuity Association.
Elected officials may choose to be covered by P.E.R:A. even though such coverage is
not compulsory.
The same general coverage provisions also apply to those school districts and
municipalities participating in the P.E.R.A. program. All school districts in the
state except the City and County of Denver, which has its own retirement program,
are included in P.E.R.A.
Only eight cities, Alamosa, Arvada, Boulder, Colorado Springs, Fort Morgan,
Gunnison, Pueblo, and Wray took advantage of the extension of P.E.R.A coverage to
municipal employees in 1943. Only the Pueblo County Health Department has elected
to cover its employees under P.E.R.A., and no public housing authorities have
chosen such coverage.

1.

Chapter 111, Article 1 through 6, C.R.S. 1953 as amended by CS 1957.

Elective officials of these political subdivisions are exempt from P.E.R.A
membership, as are policemen and firemen, who belong to a separate retirement
system. These elective officials as well as state elective officials may choose
to be covered by P.E.R.A., if they so desire.
Retirement Benefits under P.E.R.A.
The benefits are generally similar under the three major divisions of P .E. R.A.
(state, school, and municipal). The judges have a separate schedule of benefits
as do members of the Colorado State Patrol. The latter group is a part of the state
division. The provisions enumerated below apply to the three major P.E.R.A.
divisions.
Retirement for Age

. Retirement is possible: 1) at any age after 35 years of service; 2) at age
55 with 30 years of service (35 years for school employees); 3) at age 60 with 20
years of service; 4) at age 65 with at least five years of service. The maximum
annuity for those retiring prior to age 65 is $300 per ~onth, or 50 per cent of the
average annual salary for the highest five consecutive years in the last 10 years
of service, whichever is less.
Employees who retire at age 65 or later with 20 years of service or more
receive 50 per cent of the average annual salary for the highest five consecutive
years in the last 10 years of service with no maximum limit. Those who retire
at age 65 or later with less than 20 years of service receive an annuity
proportionate to the years of service prior to retirement. For example, an employee
who retires at age 65 or later with 10 years service would receive one-half as
much as one who retires at the same age with 20 years service, or 25 per cent
of the avera~e annual salary for the highest five consecutive years in his ten
years of service. No employee may receive an annuity at or after age 65, unless
he has at least five years of service at the tit!M3 of retirement.
An employee who works longer than 20 years and retires at age 65 or later
receives the same monthly annuity he would have received had he retired at age
65 with 20 years service. In other words, except for allowing an earlier retirement
age (at any age with 35 years' service or at age 55 - 30 years service), years
of service in excess of 20 years do not qualify the employee for greater retirement
benefits. Even though benefits do not increase, employees continue to pay their
contributions into the retirement program for as long as they work in P.E.R.A. covered employment.
Retirement for Disability
An employee with five years of service for which contributions have been
made to P.E.R.A. is entitled to a full retirement annuity if he becomes permanently
disable<l on the job. An employee with 15 years of service -- five years as a
contributing P.E.R.A. member -- is entitled to a full retirement annuity if he
has a non-employment permanent disability.
Survivorship Benefits
Survivorship benefits were added to the P.E.R.A. program as a result of
·legislative action taken by the Forty-First General Assembly, first session, in 1957.
- 2 -

If a deceased member having five or more years of covered service leaves a widow
and one or more children under 18, the widow shall receive $200 per month until the
youngest child reaches age 18.2 This amount applies regardless of the salary
of the deceased or the number of children. Upon remarriage or death of the widow
prior to the youngest child's reaching age 18, the widow's allowances of $200
ceases, but the children are then entitled to $75 per month per child, not to
exceed a total of $200 per month to be distributed equally · among three or more
children. This benefit also applies if there is no widow, but only surviving
children of a deceased member having five or more years of covered service.

/

If a member upon death has no children under 18 years, but leaves a widow,
she receives an ftnnuity of approximately 25 per cent of the member's final
average salary, in most cases. This annuity commences trhen the widow attains age
62 and is payable for life or until remarriage.

-

The widow of a deceased member having 15 or more years credited service
receives a benefit of approximately 25 per cent of the member's final average
salary, starti'ng at age 50 and payable for life or 1 mtil remarriar.;e. ffhen no
children or widow survive but dependent parents are living, a benefit of $75 per
month for each parent may be paid.
Dea th Benefits
In the event an employee covered under P.E.R.A. dies prior to eligibility for
retirement and survivorship benefits are not payable, a lump sum refund is made
to his named beneficiary, or in the event that he is eligible for retire~nt the
plan provides for a reduced joint life, ordinary annuity, to the beneficiary
who will receive monthly payments.
Deferred Annuity
The deferred annuity was another benefit added by legislative action in 1957.
Members leaving P.E.R.A. -- covered service after five or more years are entitled
to leave their retirement deposits in the system until age 66. At that time, they
will be eligible to receive a deferred annuity based on 2 .5 per cent of final
average salary multiplied by the number of years of covered service, not to exceed 20.
Colorado State Patrol

.,

Members of the Colorado State Patrol, in general, receive the same retirement
benefits as other members of P.E.R.A., with two notable exceptions: 1) Members
of the highway patrol may retire at age 55 with 20 years' service or at any age
with 30 years of service; 2) Members of the highway patrol are immediately eligible
for benefits ·for disabilities incurred in the performance of official duties.
Retirement at age 55 is at one-half pay based on the same formula as for other
P.E.R.A. members, except for the maximum limitation imposed. Annuity payments to
highway patrolmen with early retirement shall not exceed 60 per cent of the maximum
salary for the rank of state patrolmen durinp, the same period.

2.

Members may elect to participate in an optional group insurance program at
nominal monthly cost to provide survivorship benefits prior to becoming
eligible for these benefits under P.E.R.A.

- ~

Members of the state patrol pay an additional one per cent payroll contribution
because of these more liberal benefits.
Judges of Courts of Record
Supreme court, district oourt, county court, and juvenile court judges who have
served for an aggregate period of 10 years-~ not ~cessarily consecutive -- and
who have reached the age of 65 years are eligible for retirement annuities according
to the following schedule: 1) at least 10 years of service, but less than 16 years,
a monthly annuity equal to 40 per cent of the highest monthly salary received during
any five consecutive years of service contained within the 10 years of service
immediately preceding retirement; 2) 16 years of service or more, a monthly annuity
equal to 50 per cent of the average of the highest monthly salary received during
any period of five consecutive years of service contained within the 10 years of
service immediately preceding his retirement. Judges are eligible for all other
P.E.R.A. benefits.
Benefit Changes Since 1931
When P.E.R.A. was first established for state employees in 1931, retirement
eligibility was based on 20 years service at age 65 or 35 years service at any age.
Upon retirement, a state employee was eligible for benefits equal to 50 per cent
of his average salary during his last five years of service or $150 per month,
whichever was less.
In 1935, the act was amended to provide comp~lsory retirement at age 70.
To be eligible for retirement benefits, a state employee had to have a minimum of
five years service. His annuity was based on the following formula: Number of years
of service times 1/20 time 50 per cent of average annual salary for the last five
years of service. The maximum annuity remained at $150 per month. The compulsory
retirement provision was removed in 1939. Instead, voluntary retirement at age 70
was made possible, if such employees had contributed to P.E.R.A. since its creation
in 1931, and had 15 years' service or more.
Statutory changes in 1943 also included the provision of retirement benefits
for municipal and school employees now eligible for coverage. School employees
could retire after 35 years of covered employment at age 55 (municipal employees
30 years at age 55) or at age 65 after 20 years of covered employment. Upon
retirement, the benefit would be equal to 40 per cent of final average salary
during last five years of service, but not to exceed $100 per month.
Retirement eligibility provisions were again changed in 1945. Legislation
passed at that time made it possible for an employee to retire at age 65 if he had
worked for the state 15 years or more, or at age 70 if he had worked for the state
for five years or more and had been a member of P.E.R.A. for at least five years.
The amount of annuity continued to be based on 1/20 times years of service times
50 per cent of average salary during the last five years of service, with a maximum
of $150 per month. The present retirement eligibility rules for the state patrol
were also enacted into law in 1945.
The current retirement eligibility provisions were enacted into law in 1947.
These included retirement at age 55 with 30 years' service, (35 years for school
employees) retirement at age 60 with 20 years of service, and retirement at age

•
;.

·~

65 with 5 years of service. The formula for computing retirement annuities remained
the same, as did the $150 monthly maximum limit. This monthly maximum was raised
to $200 in 1949, and in 1953 the law was again changed so that the $200 limit
applied only to those who retired before the age of 65. For those retiring at age
65·or later, the maximum is equal to one-half of the final average salary for the
highest five consecutive years in the last 10 years of service. An employee with
20 years service at age 65 1 therefore, would ·be eligible for the maximum annuity.
In 1957 1 the $200 monthly annuity limitation for employees who retire prior to
their 65th birthday was raised to $aoo.
Survivorship benefits arxl deferred annuities were also added to P.E.R.A. through
legislation passed in 1957. Disability retirement annuities were made part of the
plan at its inception in 1931.
Optional Annuities
Employees who retire with P.E.R.A. benefits may choose one of four different
annuities. Selection must be made at the time of retirement and no subsequent
change may be made. The four annuity plans include: 1) a single life, ordinary
annuity, payable for the life of the employee only, and terminating at his death
without refund of aey kind to the estate of the deceased annuitant or to his or
her beneficiary of aey difference in the amount paid into the fund by such employee
and the amount withdrawn by him prior to his death; 2) a reduced single life, refun«t
annuity which is the actuarial equivalent of the annuity in (1), payable only during
the life of the employee, with a refund to his beneficiary or estate of any 1difference
between the amount of his contributions and the amourit withdrawn prior to his
death; 3) a reduced joint life, ordinary annuity, which is the actuarial equivalent
of the annuity payable in (1), payable for the joint lives of the employee and his
designated co-beneficiary without any refund to the estate of either upon their
deaths; and 4) a reduced joint life, ordinary annuity which is the actuarial
equivalent of the annuity payable in (1), payable to the employee and his designated
co-beneficiary in monthly amounts which shall be decreased by one-half upon the
death of either of them, without refund to the estate of either upon their deaths.
....

Prior Service Credits
Prior service credits for retirement are usually granted in recognition of
service performed by older employees prior to the establishment of a retirement
program. Such credits may also be granted to employees who did not join a
retirement plan when it was established, but who chose to do so at a later date.
Prior service credits were granted only to the members of the state division of
P.E.R.A.

'

'

Employees who had worked for the state prior to the start of P.E.R.A. in 1931,
received credit for those years of service when they retired if they had become
members of P.E.R.A. before retirement. Employees who met the retirement eligibili1iyrequirements of age 65 and 20 years service or 35 years service at any age, could
receive the maximum retirement annuity even though any or most of this service
occured prior to the creation of P.E.R.A. but no retirements were allowed until
1936 or after at least five years' payment and service. 'Ihese prior service credits
wera granted without any employee contributions required. State employees were
also eligible for certain other prior service credits up.on payment of back
cont"ributions with interest at four per cent compounded semiannually.
- 5 -
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The act creating the retirement system, in 1931, provided that state employees
at that time could join the plan up to 1933, and receive credit back to August,
1931, by paying back contributions with four per cent interest compounded semiannually.
In 1939, a provision was added that any employee not yet 55 years of age who began
his employment with the state prior to'July 1, 1940, could receive credit back to
1931, upon the payment of back contributions am interest.
j

Prio·r service credits were further liberalized in 1941. A retirement act
amendment passed in that .year made it possible for state employees who were in
state service prior to 1931 to join the retirement plan if they had not already
done so. This provision repealed the restriction in the 1931 law which gave state
employees at that time only until 1933 to join the plan. Through the same statutory
amendment, these employees could receive prior service credits back to·l931, upon
payment of back contributions and interest, but no service credit was allowed to
such members for service rendered before 1931. Employees in state service prior
to 1941 who had not joined the retirement system were also· provided for in this
legislation. These employees, if they subsequently joined P.E.R.A. could also
back-date their credits to January 1, 1941, by paying back contributions and
interest.
Credits for military service were also provided by legislation in 1941 and
1945. State employees who served in the armed forces received retirement credit
for the period of such service. No payments were necessary if the compensation
received while a member of the armed forces was less than the salary received as
a state employee.
State Department of Employment personnel who were on the federal payroll during
the time this agency was under federal control also were eligible for prior service
credits upon back payment of contributions with interest to cover this period.
Those who were state employees prior to this transfer and who had withdrawn their
P.E.R.A. contributions were required to pay back these contributions with interest
in addition to those which covered the period during which they were employed
by the federal government.
Employees who withdraw their accumulated contributions am leave covered
service and then re-enter such service within five years my restore their
retirement credits by repaying the amount withdrawn in addition to an amount
with interest equa 1 to the contributions which would have been made had they
remained in state service.
Teachers' Retirement Fund
Although prior service credits are not allowed for municipal and school
members of P.E.R.A., the General Assembly has provided minimum benefits for

teachers ,.,ho have retired with little or no coverag~ under P.E.R.A. These
benefits, however, do not make up for the lack of pr:i._or service credits. The
General Assembly established a separate teacher retirement fund in 1951 to be
administered by the Commissioner of Education. Teachers who retire prior to July
1, 1967, and who have had 20 years' service and are at least 65 years of age are
eligible for a maximum monthly benefit of $100. Any an.nui ty received from P.E.R.A.
is subtracted from the $100 maximum~·
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Contributions and Costs
P.E.R.A. is a joint-contributory retirement plan, operating on an actuarial
reserve basis. 3 Contributions are made by both employer and employee as service
is rendered. In general, both employees and employers at present contribute six
per cent of the employee's salary to the retirement association. State patrol
employees and judges are the two exceptions.· Because of more costly retirement
benefits, both the patrol employees and the state contribute at a seven per cent
rate. The judges contribute six per cent, but the employer's contribution is 12
per cent.

-

Contribution rates are often mistakenly equated with the actual cost of a
retirement plan. The employee may assume that because both he and the employer
contribute at the same rate, he is paying 50 per cent of the cost of his retirement
annuity. Actually, the employee's contributions to P.E.R.A. are more li,kely to
constitute 25 or 30 per cent of the value of his retirement annuity. The employer
may also think that he is contributing 50 per cent of the cost of retirement or
that his contributions are paying the employer's entire cost, whatever proportion
of the total this cost might be. Actually, the employer's contributions have not
met his share for a number of reasons which will be discussed after employees'
contributions are analyzed.
Examples of Employee Contributions
A state employee who is 65 and has worked for 20 years and who has a final
averaRe salary of $4,800 (based on the high consecutive five years in the last
10 years of employment) is eligible for a $200 per month retirement annuity
until death. According to the mortality table used by P.E.R.A., the value of his
retirement annuity is approximately $26,880. Assuming that this employee has
contributed six per cent of his salary throughout his 20 years of service, the
total amount of his contributions including interest is approximately $7,202, or
26,8 per cent of the value of his retirement annuity.

-.

....

If this same employee had retired at age 60 with 20 years of service and
the same final average salary ($4,800), the value of his retirement annuity would
be approximately $31,920. The employee's contributions to P.E.R.A. including
interest, would be approximately $7,049 or 22.1 per cent of the val~e of his
retirement annuity. His contribution total is less at age 60 than it would be
for 20 years' service at age 65 because he would be at his maximum salary for fewer
years, according to the actuarial tables and would live longer after retirement.
If this same employee had retired at age 55 with 30 years of service and
the same final average salary ($4,800) the value of his retirement annuity would
be approximately $36,960. The employee's contributions to P.E.R.A., including
interest, would be approximately $11,590 or 31.3 per cent of the value of his
retirement annuity. Although this employee would have contributed to P.E.R.A •
for 30 years instead of 20, he would still be paying less than one-third of the
cost of his retirement annuity.

3.

Know Your Colorado Retirement Plan, issued by the P.E.R.A. Board of Control.

On the other hand, this same employee would be paying almost half of his
retirement annuity if he had worked for 30 years prior to retirement at age 65.
Assuming a final average salary of $4,800, he would have contributed approximately
$12,024 or 44.7 per cent of the value of his retirement annuity; yet he would receive
no greater annuity than an employee who worked 20 years and retired at age 65 after
contributing 26.8 per cent of his final annuity.
These examples are not intended as argument either for or against the concept
that employees should pay: approximately one-half of the cost of their retirement
annuity. Rather they dispute the commonly held assumption that employees are
making such contributions at present.
These examples are based on two premises: 1) that the employee's salary
increases gradually throughout his period of employment with his. salary level not
appreciably affected by inflation; and 2) that the employee's rate of contribution
remains the same throughout his period of employment. If ·this employee had large
salary increases during his last 10 years of service, ard/or had contributed at a
lesser rate during the period of significantly lower salary, the portion he would
have contributed of his final annuity would be less. These conditions would
reduce the proportion of the retirement annuity financed by the employee, because
his annuity would be based on a final average salary resulting from the large
salary increases ard/or because his retirement annuity would be based on the larger
contribution rate, regardless of the number of years he may have been paying. into
the retirement furn at a lesser rate.

,..

..

Employee Contribution Changes arrl Salary Increases
Changes in the contribution.rate and the sizable increase in salaries since
World lfar II has had an effect on the proportion of retirement annuities financed
through contributions to P .E.R.A. by state, school, and municipal employees ....
some of whom have already retired. As of June 30, 1958, 88.6 per cent of the
liabilities for retired or deceased state employees were employer financed.4
The proportions for the s'chool and municipal division employees were similar;
85.9 per cent for schools, and 83.7 per cent for municipal.5 Only $1.4 million
of the $12.3 million liabilities for retired members in the state division as of
June 30, 1958 were employee financed. Employees financed $314 000 of the $2.2
·
million liabilities in the school division and $57,000 of the $351,000 liabilities
in the municipal divisions. One of the reasons for this small proportion of employee
contributions was the lower contribution rate in effect during the .first ten·
years or more of service, another was the large salary increases after World. 'War· II
from which their final average salaries resulted. A significant factor was the ·
prior·service credit granted to those state employees with a considerabl~ number of
years of service before the retirement system was established in 1931.

4. Actuarial Valuation, Members and Annuitants, P.E.R.A. of Colorado, A.G. Gabriel,
5.

June 30, 1958, p. 17.
Ibid. p. 34 and p. 48.

. , .
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When the retirement program was set up, state employees were required to
contribute at a rate of 3.5 per cent of mont~ly salary. This contribution rate
obtained until 1949, when, as a result of legislation passed in 1947, the rate
was increased to five per cent; annuity benefits were also increased.
In 1957, legislation was passed to increase the rate to six per cent as of
July 1, 1958. At the same time, survivorship benefits and -deferred annuities were
added to the plan.
During the post-war period, there has been a steady increase in state
employees' salaries. Since 1952, there has been an average annual increase of
4.7 per cent. Salaries for school administrators and teachers have almost
doubled since 1946. The rate increase from 1952 to 1958 was 38.5 per cent, or
almost 6.5 per cent per year. Municipal salaries have increased approximately 20
per cent since 1954, or five per cent per year. 6
Employer's Contributions
The employer's portion of P.E.R.A. retirement annuities comes from the
contributions made by the participating agencies and political subdivisions.
These contributions are based on a proportion of ·the payroll for the agency's or
subdivision's e~ployees who are members of P.E.R.A. The employer's contributions
as well as the employees' are invested, with the resultant earnings also accruing
to the retirement fund. l"hile employees who leave P.E.R.A. -- covered service
1118Y withdraw their contributions, the employers' payments remain in the fund.
State Division

During the first four years of the retirement program (1931-1935) the state
made no contributions to P.E.R.A., or the State Employees Retirement Association,
as it was then known. Legislation passed in 1935 provided that the state contribute
at a rate of 3.5 per cent of the total salaries of the members of the retirement
association; however, these funds were to come only from the delinquent tax
penalties and interest fund and not from the budgets of the participating agencies
nor throur,h a special appropriation. There was no provision for making up the
difference if this source did not produce 3.5 per cent of the retirement membership
payroll, which was always the case. It should be remembered that these were depression
years and that it was difficult for the state to meet its major obligations, let
alone provide funds for the retirement program.
According to thP. executive secretary of P.E.R.A., the original purpose of the
delinquent tax penalties and interest fund payments was to cover the state's share
of prior service credits. The largest amount ever received from the delinquent tax
penalties and interest fund was $51,784 in 1939, as compared with employees'
contributions for that year of $177,406. Since 1945, the annual amount has rarely
exceeded $25,000, with $27,213 in 1947 the highest.

6. Accurate, comprehensive and comparable data for municipal salaries not available
prior to 1954. These figures are based on three publications of the Colorado
Municipal League: 1954 Wage and Salary Survey, Colorado Cities and Towns; ffages 1
Salaries, Fringe Benefits, 1956, Colorado Cities and 1'owns; and ·wages, Salaries,
Fringe Benefits, Colorado Cities and Towns, 1958 Supplement.

For a ten-year period beginning in 1940, the General Assembly appropriated a
small amount each year to be paid to P.E.R.A. in addition to the funds from
delinquent· tax penalties and interest. In 1940 and 1941, $25,000 was appropriated
annually; from 1942 throu~h 1949, the annual appropriation was $35,000. When
state agencies began budgeting their P.E.R.A. payroll contributions in 1941, the
retirement fund received employer contributions from three sources. These were
reduced to two after 1949, when special appropriations were no longer made.
In 1941, legislation was passed which made it mandatory for state agencies
which operated on fee funds (such as revenue, agriculture, and fish and game) to
budget for P.E.R.A. contributions at a rate of 3.5 per cent of payroll -- the same
rate paid by employees. State agencies whose employees' salaries were payable through
state general fund appropriations, or from funds in whole or in part derived from
ad valorem taxes, tuition, or federal aid for extension or educational research,
could make payroll contributions to P.E.R.A., but were not required to do so. Such
contributions were made mandatory for all participating state agencies in 1945.
The employer's contribution rate was raised to five per cent as of July 1,
1949, and to six per cent as of July 1, 1958, equalling the employees' rate.
Since 1931, state employees have contributed $18,537,700 to P.E.R.A., and the state
a total of $17,005,081 from its three sources. A year by year breakdown of
contributions is shown in Table I on the following page.
The effect of the state's failure to make contributions to P.E.R.A. equal to
or in excess of employee contributions, or to finance its share of prior service
credits will be discussed in the section on Financing P.E.R.A. Retirement Benefits.
Municipal and School Divisions
In 1943, when the employees of municipalities and school districts were first
eli~ible for P.E.R.A. coverar,e, these subdivisions contributed 3.5 per cent of payroll.
'Ihis rate increased to five per cent July 1, 1949, and to six per cent July 1,
1958. The employees' rate increased in the same wav. Even though employer
contributions matched those ma'de by the employee, neither of these divisions has
met the cost of its retirement program, although their unfumed liabilities are
not as 1 extensive as those of the state division. 'lhe financing of these two
divisions will also be discussed in the following section.

Table I
P.E.R.A. - State Employee's Division
Employer and Employee Contributions, 1931 - 1958a

...
,,.,

Employee
Year
Contributions
Ending
8/1/31 to
$135,909.76
6/30/33
83,456.61
6/30/34
84,750.49
6/30/35
105,592.36
6/30/36
132,430.63
6/30/37
157,592.69
6/30/38
177,406.23
6/30/39
202,397.96
6/30/40
208,086.06
6/30/41
251,566.28
6/30/42
200,671.55
6/30/43
218,198.14
6/30/44
236,849.07
6/30/45
313,991.62
6/30/46
381,909.66
6/30/47
503,529.78
6/30/48
637,245.69
6/30/49
6/30/50
1,054,266.70
1,170,026.81
6/30/51
1,295,264.44
6/30/52
1,398,670.28
6/30/53
1,564,164.25
6/30/54
1,608,851.98
6/30/55
1,792,038.50
6/30/56
2,oao,aas.10
6/30/57
6/30/58
214801846,57
TOTAIS
$18,537,700.11

D. T.P .&Ib

$39,559.14
42,221.96
51,784.14
49,512.51
46,189.44
50,811.44
371401.22
33,245.ll
24,581.70
27,212.82
21,204.58
20,107,59
18,928.57
16,995.54
16,717.86
25,091.17
20,126~68
19,954,08
22,136.26
20,037.37
25,775.74
27 1 092.14
$656,607.06

State Contributions
State Payroll
Contributions
Appropriations

$25,ooo.oo
2s,ooo.oo
35,000.00
35,000.00
ss,000.00
35,000.00
as,000 ..00
35,000.00
35,ooo.oo
35,000.00

$330,000.00

Total State Contributions:
a.
b.

$91,632.75
91,306.66
100,306.27
107,392.95
212,320.3'1
204,761.42
442,034.14
586,485.16
993,242.57
1,174,2'18.82
1,246,757.28
1,352,529.22
1,507,732.00
1,623,247.53
1,737,891.12
2,016,611.71
214492813,70
$16,018,393.67
$17,oos.oao,73

Source: Executive Secretary, Public Employees Retirement Association.
Delinquent Tax Penalty and Interest Fund.
Financing P.E.R.A. Retirement Benefits

,

An actuarial valuation of the several divisions of P.E.R.A. is made every
five years by the system's consulting actuary. The most recent valuation of
P.E.R.A. was made as of June 30, 1958. In making an actuarial valuation an inventory
is made of the system's liabilities and assets. The liabilities are computed in part
on predictions based on actuarial experience. This includes items such as the time
present employees will re tire am the value of their annuities according to the
mortality tables; the employee turnover rate, which determines the amount of future
refunds, as well as the amount of employer's contributions, which will remain in
the fund; and the final average salary of present retirement system members. In
- 11 -

computing the system's assets, certain other actuarial predictions are made, such
as future contributions to the system am the amount of interest to be earned on
investment. An interest rate is assumed based on investment experience am is used
for all of these calculations. Liabilities am assets are presented in an
ac-tuarial balance sheet and ttay be divided into accrued liabilities and assets and
prospective liabilities and assets.
Accrued liabilities include the present value (in this case as of June 30,
1958) of:
1) accrued portions of superannuation annuities likely to be paid present
members, based on service rendered before July 1,. 1958;

2) expected future refunds of amounts deducted from members' salaries before
July 1, 1958; and

3) liabilities for present members·who have retired or whose beneficiaries
are receiving ·survivor benefits.
Accrued Assets include the funds on hand from both employer and employee
contributions as of June 30, 1958.

◄-

Prospective liabilities include the present value (June 30, 1958) ofs
1) prospective portions of superannuation annuities likely to be paid
present members based on services to be rendered after June 30, 1958;
2)

disability annuities likely to be paid present members;

3) death-in-service annuities likely to be paid on account of the death of
present members; and
4) expected future refunds of amounts to be deducted from members' stlaries
after June 30, 1958.
Prospective assets include the present value (June 30, 1958) of:
1)

expected future contributions to be made by present members; and

2)

expected future contributions by employer to meet prospective liabilities.

Accrued assets and accrued liabilities are balanced, and if there is any
deficit, it is identified as the accrued unfurded liability. The ex~stence of an
accrued unfunded liability indicates that sufficient contributions including interest
had not been paid into the retirement fund as of the date of the actuarial valuation
to cover the retirement benefit credits already earned by active and retired members.
Prospective assets and liabilities are also balanced.and equal each other
because the employer's contribution rate is set at that proportion of prospective
payroll which will produce an amount equal to the difference between the employees'
prospective contributions and the total prospective liabilities. This process is
known as current service financing.

- 12 -

'

State Division
As of June 30, 1958, the state division of P.E.R.A. had total liabilities of
$110,841,436.7 Of this amount, $62,856,268 were accrued liabilities, that is,
liabilities incurred from credits earned by present and retired members. 'lhese
accrued liabilities are broken down as followsi
1) accrued portions of superannuation annuities for service already rendered
by present members ••.......................... -: .................•....•.• $47 ,565 9 982
2)

expected future refunds of members' deduc'tions made before July 1,

1958 • .•.•....•.........................................•..........•.•.. $ 3,012, 942
3)

annuitant and survivor benefit reserve liabilities •••••••••• •• $12,277,344
$62,856,268

Prospective liabilities totaled $47,985,168 and included the following:

1) prospective portions of superannuation annuities likely to be ~aid present
members for services rendered after June 30, 1958 •••••••••••••••••••••• $31,512,564
2)

disability annuities likely to be paid present members •••••••• $ 1,663,258

3)

death-in-service annuities likely to be paid on account of the death of

present members•••·••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••$ 3,151,937

...

4) expected future refunds of deductions to be made after June 30 1958, by
present members •••••••••••••••••••• .- •••••••••••••••••-•••••••••••••••••• $11 1657, 909
$47,985,168
Prospective liabilities are balanced from two sources:
1)

...

the present value of expected future contributions by present members; and

2) the present value of state contributions necessary to finance future
liabilities. The present value of expected future employee contributions is
$26,384,080, based on six per cent of salary. This means that the state as
employer will have to contribute $21,601,088. This amount will be financed through
a state contribution rate of 4.94 per cent of members' payroll as calculated by the
actuary. This 4.94 per cent makes up the major portion of the state's total
contribution of six per cent and is broken down as follows:

superannuation annuities
disability annuities
death-in-service annuities

,

7.

4.09 per cent
.30 per cent
.55 per cent
4.94 per cent

Actuarial Valuation, Members and Annuitants op. cit., p. 18 and following. All
actuarial and financial data in this section are based on this report unless
otherwise indicated.

This funding of future liabilities is known as current service financing.
~11 expected future liabilities are segregated and financed through current
contributions of both employer and employee. An additional contribution on the
part of the employer might be necessary, however, to finance unfunded accru'ed
liabilities if such exist.
'Ihe accrued liabilities of almost $63 million are offset by accrued or
ledger assets. These include employer and employee accumulated contributions
with interest. As of June 30, 1958, these assets in the .state division of P.E.R.A.
totaled $27,586,658. When these accrued assets are subtracted from accrued liabilities,
an unfunded accrued liability of $35,269,610 remains. This unfunded accrued
liability exists because past employee and employer contributions including
interest have failed to approxim~te accrued liabilities, for the following reasons:
1) Prior service credits. For service before 1931, neither the state nor
the employee paid; for prior service F:ranted after 1931, employees have contributed,
but not the state to any great extent. The executive secretary of P.E.R.A. estimates
the state's unpaid share of prior service credits as slightly in excess of $12
million, .or more than a third of the total unfunded accrued liability.
2) Further deficit in state contributions. In addition to the deficit in
the state 1s prior service credit contributions, the state has not contributed
sufficiently over the years to handle its share of current service financing.
3) Salary Increases. 'lhe relatively recent salary increases have increased
the cost of the retirement plan as employees' retirement annuities are based on
final average·salary.
4) Increase in Longevity. P.E.R.A. has adopted a new mortality table in
line with the increased life expectancies of annuitants. This means that retired
members of P.E.R.A. are living longer, which raises the value of their annuities
and increases the cost of the program.
rior to a e 65. Retirement costs
5) Increase in maximum retirement annui
have also ncreased, because the maximum annuity for those members retiring prior
to age 65 has been raised from $200 per month to $300.
In a sense, this unfunded accrued liability is similar to the national debt,
in that it becomes payable over a period of/yflars, rather than all at once. As
long as the retirement system continues , current income can be used ·to fund these
liabilities as they become due. Future unfunded accrued liabilities resulting fr<lll
the use of current income to cover past unfunded accrued liabilities, in turn, may
also be financed in the same way.
To keep the unfunded accrued liability from continuing to grow, it is necessary
to meet the interest payment on this debt. 'lhe unfurded accrued liability represent•
$35 million which is not availab1e to be invested. At the interest rate assumed
by the actuary (2.5 per cent), the state division is losing $881,700 in interest
annually. 'Ihi's interest deficit can be met through an additional payroll contribution
on the part ~f. the employer, the employee, or both.
The P.E.R.A_. actuary has computed this rate at 1.76 per cent· of payroll to be
added.to the state's contribution. When this is added to the 4.94 per cent
____contribution needed for current service financing, it makes the total required state

.
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contribution rate 6.7 per cent of members' payroll. As the state is presently
contributing six per cent, only .7 per cent instead of 1.76 per cent is being
provided to meet the interest on the accrued unfunded liability. Consequently, at
the present contribution rate, the accrued unfunded liability will continue to
increase at a minimum of $381,000 per year, or the amount of interest not being
provided (assuming no increases in payroll).
The unfunded accrued liability as of June 30, 1953 (the date ~f the previous
actuarial valuation) was·$10.8 million, as compared with the present $35 million.
However, the total liability of the state division at that time was only $33 million,
as compared with almost $111 million in 1958. The accrued unfunded liability was
32.6 per cent of total liabilities in 1953, as compared with 31.8 per cent in 1958.
The accrued unfunded liability has increased 218 per cent from 1953 to 1958, _while
total liabilities have increased 236 per cent. This increase in the accrued
unfunded liability was caused by the reasons already enumerated.
In 1953, _the actuary computed the state's
financing at 5.28 per cent, with an additional
interest on the $11 million unfunded liability
to contribute at a rate of five per cent until
the interest on the accrued unfunded li~bili ty
of current financing.

Failure to meet the interest requirements on the accrued unfunded liability
in 1953 added another $1.4 million to the unfunded liability over the five-year
period. 'Approximately $700,000 more resulted from the state's failure to contribute
at the level determined necessary in 1953 to finance current service costs. Since
these items account for less than 10 per cent of the five-year increase in accrued
unfunood liability, it appears that the major reasons are: 1) the change in life
exp~ctancy for present and future annuitants; and 2) the increase in state salaries.
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contribution rate for current service
.92 per cent necessary to meet the
at that time. The state continued
July 1, 1958, so that not only was
no·t met, but neither were the costs
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The payroll for the members of the state division increased from $29 million
in 1953 to $49 million in 1958. Approximately half of this increase resulted
from addition~! employees joining state service, ard the other half from salary
increases. In 1953, the 8,336 members of the state division had an average annual
salary of $3,502. In 1958, the 11,288 members of the state division had an average
salary of $4,371, an increase of 24.8 per cent over 1953. A retirement annuity for
a state employee with 20 years service at age 65, based on a final average salary
of $4,371, has a vaiue of $4,861 more than a similar annuity for an employee with a
final average salary of $3,502. This is but one example of the effect of salary
increases on the cost of the retirement program.
Should the current trend of general salary increases continue, it is likely
that the unfunded accrued liability will continue to grow, al though these increases .
will be offset to some extent by a larger payroll upon which contributions would
be based. Any further increase in longevity would also increase retirement program·.
costs.
There are several approaches which might be taken toward meeting the unfunded
accrued liability. First, the state as employer can continue to follow its present
policy -- one of meetin~ partially the interest requirements, with a resultant
continuing unfunded liability increase for this reason alone. Second, the ~tate
can increase its contribution ·to the extent necessary to meet the interest on the
unfunded liability. If this is done, the unfunded liability will not increase,

..II

assuming other factors remain stable. 'Ihird, the unfunded liability could be
amortized over a period of 20 to 40 years through an increase in the contribution
rate on the part of the employer, the employee, or both • .,. ) If .employee rates are
increased, present employees who are paying their share of >current benefits•
will be asked to pay for benefits not financed in the past. · They will also be
asked. to make up, a:t least in part, for the failure of the state to provide its
share of the co~ts in the past. A further question is what. proportion of salary
should state employees contribute to their retirement program.
If the state were to amortize the unfunded liability over a 35 year period
through an increase in payroll contributions, it would cost an estimated 7 .98 per
cent of payroll, assuming that the employees would continu·e to contribute at a, six
per cent rate. This would be 3.04 per cent more than th'e present 4.94 per cent
contribution for current service financing, 1.98 per cent more than the state is
now . contributing, and 1.28 per cent more than the rate the state should be paying
to meet the interest requirements on the unfunded liability. After the present
accrued unfunded liability is retired in 1994, the state rate· would return to 4.94
per cent, as compared with six per cent for employees, uniess there were continued
increases in the unfunded acc~ued liability which would make it impossible to
amortize it by that time.
Interest on Investments
It has been suggested that the interest requirements of the unfunded liability
mi~ht be met at least in part by an increase in the earning yd.elds on present and
future investments in the state divisions of P.E.R.A.
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In making the actuarial valuation, the interest rate assumed by the actuary
for all divisions of P.E.R.A. was 2.5 per cent, the same as for the accrued unfunded
liability. This rate is applied to the ledger or accrued assets.
As of June 30, 1958, the state division had accrued assets of almost $27.6
million; 2.5 per cent of this amount would be $690,000. During the year ending
June: 30, 1958, the state divis.fon realized a gross interest return of $663,000.
Added to this was a net total of $57,000, the difference between profit earned on
redeemed investments and commissions paid on the purchase of new ones. When
the state division•~ prorated share of administrative expenses ($61 1 000) is
deducted, it leaves·a net return of $659,000. 8 However, $4 million in securities
at ~n '. interest yield rate of four per cent were purchased too near the end of
the fiscal year . to realize any investment return, and another $3 million at varied
rates of interest (all 2.5 per cent or more) were purchased too near the end of the
fiscal year to realize full return on investment. Assuming approximately the
same amount of administrative expense, these investments should produce approxi.,tel.y
$789.000 in earnings during the 1958-59 fiscal year, or 2.86 per cent of assets.

Public E lo ees Retirement Association of Colorado
nnual Audit as o June 30, 1958 alter • eider and ompany, enver.
9. P~E.R.A. has computed the effective yield on the present investment portfolio at
3.04 per cent. From the above calculations, this would appear to be the
approximate expected gross yield for the 1958-59 fiscal year. Actually, the
rate of return would be lower if the yield were computed on the assets in the
fund as of June 30, 1959. These yield rates are computations based on assets
as of June 30, 1958.
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The anticipated excess interest fov 1959, .36 per cent, would provide only
about $100,000 of the required $381,000 of unfunded interest. Such comparisons are,
however, invalid and, in fact, improper, since the only method of correctly measuring
the effect of the continuation of such.excess earnings is to change the interest
assumptions underlying the actuarial calculations. If such change is made in the
assumptions, however, reductions will be necessary not only in the liability items
but also in the prospective asset items, the combination of which might not produce
the amount of reduction in unfunded liabilities anticipated.
By law, the retirement board of P.E.R.A. is limited in the investment of funds
to the following:

1)

bonds and warrants of the United States of America;

2)

bonds arxi warrants of the State of Colorado;

3) certain general obligation bonds of Colorado cities, towns, and school
districts; and
4) promissory notes secured by first lien mortgages or deeds of trust on real
estate situated in Colorado and guaranteed or insured by the U.S. Government.

It would necessitate a statutory amendment, if the retirement board desired to
improve its interest rate through purchase of blue chip stocks or top-rated private
industry and utility bonds.
School and Municipal Divisions
Actuarial valuations are also made at the same five-year intervals for the school
and municipal divisions. As of June 30, 1958, neither division showed as large an
unfunded accrued liability as the·state division. The school division had an
unfunded accrued liability of $14.9 million and the nrunicipal division, $547,144.
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There are several reasons why the unfunded accrued liabilities are less in these
two divisions than in the state division. First, neither division granted prior
service credits. Second, employers in both divisions have always contributed at the
same rate as employees since both divisions were created in 1943. Third, a greater
proportion of the liabilities in the school and municipal divisions are prospective,
rather than accrued -- approximately 65 per cent for the school division and 59
per cent for the municipal division, as compared with 44 per cent for the state
division. Both of these divisions are 12 years younger than the state division
and therefore have retired fewer people, as well as having less accrued service
credits for present members. Fourth, the municipal division has so few members
that its total liabilities of $7.7 million are only 22 per cent as large as the
state division's unfunded accrued liability.
The school division's unfunded accrued liability has increased from $639,000
in 1953 to almost $15 million in 1958. The large increase in school administrative
and teaching salaries has been largely responsible for this rise. The average
salary for the 8,347 school division members in 1953 was $3,156. In 1958, the
average salary was $3,981 for the 14,489 members -- an increase of 26.2 per cent.

Another reason for the increase in unfunded accrued liabilities was the
failure of the employers in the school division to contribute the 1953 actuarially:
determined rate of 5.66 per cent of the members' payroll. Only a small portion of
this total, .06 per cent, was required to meet the interest on the accrued deficit
As was
the case with the state division, school division employers continued to contribute
at the five per cent rate until July 1, 1958.

at. that time; the remainder was allocated for current service financing.

In order to meet the interest requirements of the school division's present
unfunded accrued liabi 1i ty, a contribution rate of .65 pe·r cent is considered
necessary. The cost of current service financing is 5.87 per cent, bringing the
total contribution rate to 6.52 per cent. The school division employers are currently
contributing at a six per cent rate. Consequently, nearly $300,000 annually in
interest on the unfunded accrued liability is not being financed by; the present
contribution rate.
·

The municipal division did not have any accrued unfunded liability in 1953;
rather, this d-ivision had a $300,000 surplus. This surplus, plus the five per cent
contribution rate by municipal employers, when only 4.46 per cent was necessary
tor current service financing, were the reasons that the eresent municipal division
unfunded accrued liability is only sli¢,tly in ex~ess of $500,000 dollars. Municipal
salaries have also been on the rise. '!he average salary for the 845 municipal
members in 1953 was $3,350. In 1958 the average salary was $3,995 for the 1,129
members, an increase of 19.2 per cent. The six per cent contribution rate also
maintained for municipal employers will be sufficient to handle current service
financing and amortize the accrued unfunded liability in 15.2 years. '!he total
current service contribution rate is 5.03 per cent, with an additional .97 per
cent to amortize the accrued unfunded liability. The municipal division, therefore,
is the only one of the three which has any prospect of amortizing its accrued
unfunded liability at present contribution rates.
Miscellaneous P.E.R.A. Provisions
Contribution Refunds
Members who leave P.E.R.A. covered employment may withdraw their accumulated
contributions without interest; however, their $5 membership fees are retained by
P.E~i.A. As has been indicated above, members with at least five years of service
may choose to leave contributions in the fund atxl receive a deferred annuity at
age 65.
When P.E.R.A. was set up· in 1931, the statues provided that members who left
state service could withdraw their accumulated contributions with 2.5 per cent
interest compounded semiannually. '!his provision was amended in 1935 to e'xclude
the payment of interest on accumulated contributions. This amendment was nm.de
because the small accumulation of assets made it difficult for the retirement fund
to return contributions with interest and meet other obligations.
Administration of P.E.R.A.
A retirement board not to exceed 13 members is charged by statute with the
responsibility for managing P.E.R.A. Three members of this board are state officials
who serve permanently; the secretary of state, the state treasurer, and the state
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auditor.

Four board members represent the state division and are elected to serve
stag~ered four-year terms. The school and municipal divisions are also entitled
to representation on the board and may elect one board member for each 1,000 members,
not to exceed a· total of three. As presently constituted, the board consists of the
three state officials, four representatives of the state division, three representatives
of the school division and one representative of the municipal division, which.has
slightly in exc~ss of 1,100 members.

Originally the reti~ement board consisted of seven members, but the number was
increased in 1943 to provide for representation of school and municipal members, who
became eligible for participation at that time.
The board is empowered to establish the rules and regulations for the administratior,
of the retirement fund and to require that public employers furnish and keep such
records as the board deems necessary for the discharge of its duties. 'lhe retirement
board elects its own chairman and has the authority to appoint an execut'ive secretary
and such other employees as are considered necessary. The board also has the final
power to determine the status of any state employee in respect to any provision
of the retirement program. An executive secretary is employed by the _board, who
serves as the retirement pro~ram administrator. Administrative expenses in the
1957-58 fiscal year totaled $145,423t which was apportioned among the f~ur P.E.R.A.
divisions, according to each division's proportion of total membership., The school
division, h.aving the largest membership, was assessed $77,146 for administrative
expenses; the state division, $61,571; the municipal division, $6,044; and judges•
division, $662.
Problems of Coverage Under P.E.R.A.
All full-time permanent employees of the state and those political subdivisions
participating in the P.E.R.A. program, except for those categories of employees
already cite~, are required to be members of P.E.R.A. For a variety of reasons,
some of these employees are not covered, and there is no legal requirement that
coverage be provided for temporary and/or part-time employees.
,..

State Division
The State Controller, in a memorandum dated November 1, 1950, set forth the
rule for determining temporary arxl. permanent employees:
"Temporary employees shall be deemed to be those employed to
fill a specific 'temporary position, where such position is approved
by the Civil Service Commission and the Governor's office as a
temporary one. Likewise, those employed continuously for a period
less than one year shall.be deemed to be employees assigned to a
specific posi'tion of less than one year's duration. Accordingly,
if the position is permanent and continuing; the employee assigned
is also permanent (for the applicatiomof the retirement deduction)t
unless the term of employment is for a specific period of time
·
less than one yea~. Whether or not the employee is certified
into the classified service, or on a provisional" basis, is immaterial."

--,

s
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Administrators of the P.E.R.A. program are of the opinion that state department
and agerey heads have placed to~ loose a construction upon the word "temporary" in
determining whether an employee should be covered by the retirement act. The State
Highway Department and the State Hospital classify employees who work for six months
or less as temporary. Other agencies generally use an employment per,iod of 12
months to determine whether an employee may be considered permanent for the purposes
of retirement coverage.
The P.E.R.A. retirement board has appeared reluctant to make an issue of
requiring eligible employees to participate in the retirement program even though
it has the authority to do so. The executive secretary of P.E.R.A. ttas pointed
out that there are no penalties provided by law which may be imposed upon agencies
or employees for not joining. It would seem, however, that an~ttor~~y general's
opinion on the matter mi~ht be a sufficient mandate to require compliance.
In addition to those employees of various state agencies who may or may not
be permanent employees, there are approximately 5 1 000 who are actually temporary,
part-time, or ·exempt from P.E.R.A. coverage.10 The greatest number of these
employees were classified as temporary and were found to be employed principally
by the universities and colleges (4 1 000); state hospital (244); State Home and
?raining Schools at Ridge and Grand Junction (205); Department of Aqiculture (53)J
Office of the State Engineer (49); and the State Highway Department.
These employees are provided with no retirement coverage at all while in the
employ of the state. It has been suggested that coverage might be provided for these
people throu~h a statutory change in the definition of P.E.R.A. eligibility, such
change to make coverage mandatory for any employees who are on the payroll longer
than 90 days or six months. This approach confuses P.E.R.A. membership with effective
retirement coverage. Bona fide temporary or part-time employees would be required
to contribute to P.E.R.A. as would the employing agencies. These employees would have
their contributions returned upon leaving state service, the employing agency would
have added expense because its contributions would remain in the fund, and P.E.R.A.
would have an added administrative burden in handling, accounting for, and returning
funds. Most temporary employees can ill afford to have six per cent deducted from
their earnings, and such deductions accomplish no purpose if they are merely forced
savings rather than contributions toward earned retirement credits.
Coverage of these temporary and part-time employees under Old Age Survivors
Disability Insurance (O.A.S.D.I.) is one possible solution to the problem.
The ways in which such coverage can be accomplished are discussed in subsequent
chapters of this report. If these employees are placed under O.A.S.D.I., however,;·
there is a question as to what course should be followed if any of them ultimatley
become full-time, permanent employees. They would then become eligible for P.E.R.A.,

am

10.

11.

A Legislative Council state payroll su:nrey which .c~vered the 1956-57 fiscal
year showed that on the average 4,670 state employees who drew warrants each
m~nth were not covered by P.E.R.A. In addition, the State Highway Department
h1res several hundred laborers each year on a temporary basis.
Legislative Council Memorandum to the Forty-first General Assembly on Public
Employees' Retirement, January, 1958, p. 3.
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which is not now combined in ay way with O.A. S .D. I. Either these employees would
have to ~ive up O.A.S.D.I. or would be required to carry both O.A.S.D.I. and
P.E.R.A. coverage.

The latter course would impose a high contribution rate
(10.5 per cent on first $4,800 of salary, by 1969) upon employer and employee
alike and would result in a few employees (those covered by both P.E.R.A. and
O.A.S.D.I.) receiving much greater retirement benefits than their co-workers
covered only by P.E.R.A.
School and Municipal Divi.sion
The school and municipal divisions also have some temporary and part-time
employees, who at present do not have any retirement coverage. The problem is not
as great as with the state division, and some school districts, according to the
executive secretary of P.E.R..A., are declaring some of these employees, such as
lunch room workers and custodial workers, eligible for P.E.R.A. Whether this is
a satisfactory solution will depend on whether these employees work a sufficient
length of time to be eligible for a substantial retirement benefit under P.E.R.A.
lhere is a further coverage problem in three of the member cities of the
municipal division. Arvada, Fort Morgan, am Gunnison have indicated a desire on
the part of both employees·and employers to be removed from P.E.R.A. coverage and
to obtain O.A.S.D.I. coverage instead. Under present law, there is no way in
tmich these cities can terminate P.E.R.A. membership. There is also no way
under present federal social security laws and regulations that these cities could
become covered by O.A.S.D.I. if they drop P.E.R.A. first.12
All three of these cities were contacted by the Legislative Council staff,
and the problem was discussed with both employees and city officials.

...
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Arvada
Arvada has 27 employees classified as permanent and full-time, and all 27
are presently covered by P.E.R.A. The city manager has indicated that both the
city and the employees wanted ·to get out of P.E.R.A. and secure O.A.S.D.I.
coverage and added that Arvada has been trying to do this for several years. He
emphasized that the city was not overly converned about the six per cent contribution
rate, but that employee turnover rendered P.E.R.A. useless in Arvada. Only one
employee at present appears to have the possibility of retiring under P.E.R.A.
Fort Morgan

.
.

Fort Morgan has 66 permanent full-time employees, and only 19 of them are
covered by P.E.R.A. The 47 not covered object to being included, and apparently
the city administration is sympathetic to their viewpoint. At a meeting of 65
employees and city coun~il members, the employees voted unanimously to substitute
O.A.S.D.I. for P.E.R.A., even after the provisions and advantages of P.E.R.A. were
discussed. Several of the 19 covered employees indicated that they would be willing
to forgo their P.E.R.A. benefits in order to get the situation straightened out •

12.

The possibilities of accomplishing what the three cities wish will be discussed
in subsequent chapters of this report dealing with O.A.S.D.I. and public
employee retirement systems.
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Employee turnover and the lack of a career service are the major reasons why FoM
Morgan finds P.E.R.A. unacceptable. Fort Morgan accepted P.E.R.A. coverage in
1943 in order to do something for its employees when O.A. S.D .I. coverage was not
possible for public employees. l·ben such coverage was made available in· 1950, the
city was unable to avail itself of it, because of its P.E.R.A. membership.
Gunnison

J'

The city of Gunnison has 20 full-time employees of which only two are covered
One of these two employees is an elected official, who requested
inclusion under P .E .R .A. There are two reasons why Gunnison has not forced its
employees under P.E.R.A. First, Gunnison has an annual employee turnover rate of
about 30 per cent. Second, the employees, most of whom are in the low salary
brackets, do not wa,nt such large deductions taken from their pay check, especially
since most of them are transient. The mayor and city manager were of the opinion
that any improvement in the retirement program or any fringe.benefits would have
little effect on the turnover rate. The municipal salary scale is unfavorable when
compared with private employment in unskilled jobs, and it is this relationship
which cause.s the high rate of turnover. With one exception, employees and officials
were in agreement on their desire to substitute O.A.S.D.I. for P.E.R.A.
by P .E.R.A.

Legally all full-time permanent employees of these municipalities are required
to be members of P.E.R.A. But the retirement board has not forced compliance even
though it has the authority to do so. This policy of partial coverage in Fort
Morgan and Gunnison has not provided a satisfactory solution to the problem.
The other five municipal members of P.E.R.A. (Alamosa, Boulder, Colorado
Springs, Pueblo, and Wray) appear_ generally satisfied with P.E.R.A.,at least to
the extent that none of them wishes to do away with P.E.R.A. entirely. Boulder
has expressed interest, as have a number of Pueblo employees, in a combination
of P.E.R.A. and O.A.S.D.I.
Boulder, Colorado Springs, arrl Pueblo are large enough, with adequate salary
scales, to have career service programs. P.E.R.A. fits in more with this employment
situation than in those cities with a high annual turnover rate.
The member cities of P.E.R.A. which have the highest rate of employee turnover,
such as Fort Morgan arrl Gunnison, feel that their employee contributions are going
to finance retirement of career service employees in other cities. One way to
avoid this resentment would be to establish each city as a separate retirement system
with its contributio~ rates based upon its own actuarial experience; such a method,
however, would entail large administrative costs. Other methods can be found to
produce the desired objective with only moderate increases in administrative costs.
Older Employees and P.E.R.A.
Another problem of some importance is the number of older employees who reach
age 65 or more without sufficient years of service to provide them with more than
a small retirement benefit under P.E.R.A. This is especially a problem in the school
division where, as of June 30, 1958, 530 employees over the age of 59 had four
years of service or less. This group comprises one-third of the school division
membership in this age category. Almost 20 per cent of all state members over 59
years of age fall in this category, as do 25 per cent of the municipal division
membership.
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Table II shows the number of older employees in each division by age group
who have less than four years service and those with 5-9 years service. Also
shown is the proportion of members in each age group who fall in these categories.
,Table II

Older Employees Covered

by

P.E.R.A., Age, and

Years of Service, June 30, 19588

State
5-9 years
0-4 yee'rs
No. Pct.b No. Pct.b

Age
59-61
62-64
65 &
Over
Total

-;·

.

......

School
0-4
years
5-9 years
.No.
Pct. b '.No. Pct.b

!!nici:eal
5-9 yearsb
Pct.b No. .Pct.

0-4 years

No.

165
i15

28.3% 73
21.5 140

12 .5%
26.2

253
139

41.2% 229
28.4
217

~7 .3%
44.4

25

i2

32.5% 30
i6
28.6

~8.9%
38.1

78

11.5 176
19.9¾ 389

25.9
21.6%

138
530

28.9
216
33.5% 662

45.3
41.9%

9
46

13.8
30
25.0% 76

46.1

358

42.4%

Actuarial Valuation 1 Members and Annuitants 1 P.E.R.A. of Colorado,

a.

Source r

b.

June 30, 1958.
Per cent of members in age group.

Employees who have reached their 59th birthday with less than 10 years service
would have a maximum of 15 years service by age 65. 'Ibis means that macy of them
would not be eligible for a full ·retirement ar111.ui ty until age 70, and some would
have to work longer than that. Altogether, 747 older state employees fall into
this category, as do 1,192 school employees, and 124 municipal employees. This
group includes 40.5 per cent of state employees over the age of 59, 75.4 per cent
of school employees over age 59 and 67.4 per cent of municipal employees over
age 59.
Most of these employees obviously have entered public service well past their
55th birthday and it can be argued that the employer therefore has no obligation
to provide retirement benefits beyond those which accrue from their short period
of public service. It should be remembered, however, that many of these employees
have had O.A.S.D.I. covera~e prior to entering P.E.R.A. covered public employment.
During the years in which they work in P.E.R.A. covered employment, no contributions
are made to O.A.S.D.J. and consequently their salary credits' under O.A.S.D.I. are
reduced. As a result, these employees receive a small retirement benefit from each
source, the total of which may be less than that provided by the Colorado Old
Af!.e' P.ension.

.

The problem is further complicated by the fact that many of these employees
are in the low salary bracket hired at an advanced age to perform custodial work
and other unskilled services. A P.E.R.A. retirement benefit for an emplo~e making
$225 per month with five year's service at age 65 would be $28 per month. If he
has only a small benefit from O.A.S.D.I. and no other income, his only alternatives
are to continue working or to go on the old age pension. A_question may be raised
as to the efficiency of some of these older employees, especially as they approach
70. It is possible that the state and other public employers may consider manda,tory
retirement as a means of removing older, less efficient workers from public service.
In taking such a . step, retirement provisions for these older workers should be
carefully examined to see if any improvements can be made which would neither be too
closely or unfair to the long-term career service employee.

P.E.R,A.

as a Career Service Retirement Plan

The normal working career is usually considered a5 30 years or more, yet the
maximum ·amount of P.E.R.A. retirement benefits are based on 20 years~ service by
age 65. Employees who work more years for the state are penalized, because they
continue to pay into P.E.R.A. without any further increase in benefits.
The present plan also encourages employees to retire from P.E.R.A. covered
employment at an early enough age to acquire O.A.S.D.I. benefits or retirement
benefits in another plan through additional employment, An employee is able to
do this in one or two ways 1
1) He can retire from P.E.R.A. covered employment at any age arter 35 years'
service, at age 55 with 30 years' service, or at age 60 with 20 years' service and
draw P.E.R.A. retirement benefits up to $300 per month for life, and see~ other
employment.

2j Any P.E.R.A, _covered employee who works for at least five years aan
~hange,his employment and receive a deferred anrmity from P.E.R.A. at age 65. This
makes it possi~le for an employee in his forties, at the peak of his career,. to
leave P.E.R.A.
covered employment and even leave the state and still be able
to draw a deferred annuity at age 65 based on fifteen years or more of service.
P.'E.R,A. is especially advantageous to the employee who .enters covered public
eervice at age 40 or later, as he will receive the same retirement benefits as the
employee who enters covered public service at 25 or 30.
For these reasons, P.E.R.A. should be re-examined in light of public employment
personnel practices to see whether modifications may be needed in keeping with the
concepts of career service.
A Re-examination of P.E.R.A. is Desirable

The next chapters of this report deal with the possibilities and the pros and
cons of combining P.E.R.A. with O.A.S.D.l. ·Even if none of these combinations
prove_ acceptable to the General Assembly and public employees, it is still
desirable that P~E.R.A. be re-examined in light of some of the present problems to
see if adequate solutions can be found within the framework of the present
retirement program,
In brief these problems inclooe:
1) the financing of the interest and/or the amortization of present accrued
unfunded liabilities;
2) the present financing by the employer of· 70 to 75 per cent of each
retirement annuity;
3) the lack of retirement coverage for temporary, part-time,. and some fulltime employees J
4) the dissatisfaction with P,E,R.A. expressed by three municipal member
.
.cities and their employees;
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5) the employees entering P.E.R.A. covered service at an advanced age,
especially in low salary jobs, who are eligible only for small retirement
annuities; and
6) the serious question as to whether P.E.R.A. is really a career service
retirement plan.

~
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II

O.A.S.D.I. COVERAGE FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
Prior to 1950, state and local government employees were not eligible for
coverage under Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance. Between 1950 and 1954,
coverage was possible only for public employees who did not belong to a public:
employees• retirement system such as P.E.R.A. Public Law 761 passed by the 83r~
Congress in 1954 amended the Social Security Act so as to extend coverage under
O.A.S.D.I. to state and local government employees covered by retirement systems
upon favorable referendum vote of the covered members.
Public Law 880 passed during the second session of the 84th Congress in 1956
further liberalized the provisions for extending O.A.S.D.I. coverage to members of
public employee retirement programs. It authorized certain specified states am
their subdivisions which have retirement systems to divide such systems into two
groups: one in which the retirement plan would be combined with O.A.S.D.I. and
the second in which the retirement system would continue without combination with
O.A.S.D.I. This change permitted referendum to be held in which each member of
the retirement system would determine to which plan he wanted to belong. All new
employees would automatically become members of the combined plan. The named states
specifically asked for such designation, and other states have been added at their
own request.
O.A.S.D.I.:

What It Is

The federal social security act was passed in 1935 and since that time has
been amended several times. It provided originally for a national program for
~etirement and survivor benefits through employer and employee contributions.
Disability benefits were added in 1954, and further amended in 1956 and 1958.
Federal officials estimate that at least 92 per cent of the jobs in the United
States are covered by the O.A~S.D.I. program. Primary retirement benefits currently
range between a minimum of $33 and a maximum of $127, depending upon average monthly
wage. An additional benefit is pay~ble to a retirant's wife. This spouse's
benefit is equal to one-half of the husband's primary insurance benefit if the wife
has reached age 62.
Survivorship benefits for the wife and family of a fully insured individual
upon his death are p~yable up to a maximum of $254 depending on the number of
children under the age of 18 and the average salary of the insured individual. Disability benefits are also payable in an amount equal to the primary insurance
benefit for disabled fully insured individuals who have attained their 50th birthday and who have submitted proper proof of such disability. Public Law 840 passed
by the 85th Congress in 1958 further liberalized disability benefits by providing
that under certain conditions additional payments may be added to the wife and/or
children of a disabled worker.
Contribution rates for O.A.S.D.I. are currently 2.6 per cent of the first
$4,800 of annual salary for both employer and employee. These rates are scheduled
to increase to three per cent in 1960, 3.5 per cent in 1963, four per cent in 1966,
and 4.5 per cent in 1969.

O.A.s.n.r.

Coverage for Colorado Employees

The Thirty-eighth General Assembly in 1951 passed legislation to make it
possible for local government employees not part of a retirement system to be
covered under O.A.S.D.r. 1 Such legislation was necessary before the state could
enter into an agreement with the federal government for these local government
employees. This legislation provided specifically that each political subdivisi9n
of the state not belonging to a retirement plan could have'its employees covered
by O.A.S.D.I., and authorized the State Department of Employment to enter into an
agreement for this purpose.

~

Since this agreement was signed, O.A.S.D.I. coverage has been extended to
almost 20,000 local government employees in Colorado including the following
political subdivisions1

62
1
140
129
17

counties
city and county
municipalities
other local government districts
judicial districts (employees other than judges).

As a consequence of the 1954 Social Security Act Amendments, which extended
coverage to public employees who are members of another retirement system, the
Colorado General Assembly amended the state's enabling legislation to permit
members of certain public employees' retirement systems to hold a referendum
,for this _purpose. Such permission was given faculty members of institutions
of higher learning covered by the Teachers ' Insurance Annuity Association (T.I.A.A.)
and to employees of individual municipalities or subdivisions thereof having a
separate and independent retirement system, except that policemen and firemen
were excluded.2
·

-·
..,

Under the provisions of this legislation the members of two separate retire•
ment systems voted for O.A.S.D.I. coverage. Faculty members of the University of
Colorado -- the only group covered by T.I.A.A. -- voted to coordinate or partially
supplement their retirement coverage with O.A.S.D.I. Orginally, they had contributed
at a rate of seven per cent to T.I.A.A.; when o.A.S.D.I. coverage was added the
contribution rate to T.I.A.S. was reduced to five per cent. Employees of the
Denver Water Board voted to add O.A.S.D.I. coverage and contribution to the coverage
and contribution rate of their separate retirement plan. This method of combination
is known as full supplementation.

No provision was made by state legislation either in 1955 or later for a
referendum to be held by members of P.E.R.A., nor did Colorado request inclusion
as one of the states permitted to have two retirement systems as provided in the

1.
2.

111-7-1 through 8 CRS 1953 as amended by CS 1957
111-7-9 CS 1957 to CRS 1953.

-<
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1956, 1957, and 1958 amendments to the Social Security Act. It would necessitate
further amendment to the state enabling legislation before P.E.R.A. members would
be able to hold a referendum for O.A.S.D.I. coverage. If two separate retirement
systems were desired, not onl;y would amendment to the state's enabling legislation
be needed, but also a change in the federal act to add Colorado to the ~ist of
states in which two systems are permitted.

No addition or change in federal legislation would be needed to cover state
and school temporary and part-time employees, who are not eligible for P.E.R.A.,
under O.A.S.D.I. but changes would have to be made in the state's enabling legis•
lation. Temporary and part-time employees of the eight P.E.R.A. member municipalities
might be covered under O.A.S.D.I. through a modification of the present agreement
without further statutory change.
Specific Provisions for Combining O.A.S.D.I.
and Public Employee Retirement Systems·
The 1954 amendment to Section 218 of the Social Security Act sets forth the
procedure by which members of a public employee retirement system could combine
their retirement plan with O.A.S.D.I •. In setting up these procedures, the amend~
ment states congressional policy in respect.to retirement ,for public employees.
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress ••• that the protection
afforded employees in positions covered by a retirement system ••• will not be
impaired as a result of making this agreement applicable or as a result of
legislative enactment in anticipation thereof."
The amendment specifies that the governor of .the state must certify to the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare that the following conditions have
been met:
1) a referendum by secret written ballot was held on the question of whether
service in positions covered by such retirement system should be excluded fr9m or
included under an agreement to, provide O.A.S.D.I. coverage.

2). an opport~ty to vote in such referendum was given (and was limited) to
eligible employees1
3) not less than 90 days' notice of such referendum was given to all such
employees;
4) suGh referendum was conducted under the supervision of the governor, or
an agency, or individual designated by himJ and
5) a majority of the eligible employees voted in favor of including service
in such positions under an agreement to provide O.A.S.D.I. coverage.
The 1954 amendment also made it possible to divide a public employee's
retirement system into separate groups for the purposJ of holding a referendum.
Separate retirement systems could be set up for state employees, one or more
political subdivisions, and for each institution of higher learning.
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Under the provisions of the 1954 amendment, every member of a retirement
system would be covered by O.A.S.D.I., if a majority of the members voted for
such coverage. However, it would be possible to have state employees, employees
of each institution of higher learning, school employees -- either as a group or
by· school district, and employees of municipalities -- either as a group or by
municipality•• vote separately on such coverage.
These procedures still apply unless a state is designated as one of those·
which may have two retirement systems. This provision, added to the Social Security
Act in 1956, makes it possible for employees not wishing O.A.S.D.I. coverage to
continue with their present retirement system. All employees who wish O.A.S.D.I.
coverage combined with their retirement plan become .part of a new retirement
system. All new employees are required to become p'art of the combined plan.
For referendum purposes the same retirement system breakdown applies in
this situation as it does for states not desiring dual retirement plans. In
other words, it would be possible to have two state employee retirement systems,
two or more school retirement systems, two or more municipal retirement systems,
and two retirement systems for each institution of higher learning.
Fourteen states and one territory are now enumerated as tho~e in which the
retirement system(s) may be divided into two parts. Nine of these were listed
in the 1956 amendment and the rest were added by the 1957 and 1958 amendments.
These states and one territory include: California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Massachusetts, Minnesota,_New York, North Da~ota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Hawaii.
The 1958 amendment further liberalized O.A.S.D.I. coverage for public employees

..,

by providing that any employee who.originally chose to remain in the retirement

plan which was not combined with O.A.S.D.I. can change later to the plan in which
combination coverage is providedJ however, such change can be made no later than
12-31-59.
Back Dating of O.A.S.D.I. Coverage

For the purposes of computing O.A.S.D.I. retirement benefits, a covered
employee's salary is averaged from January 1, 1951, until the time of his retirement. This average includes only that portion of annual salary upon which O.A.S.D.I.
contributions were made. This means that an employee will receive a maximum. of
$4,800 for any one ye~r and with no salary in years in which the employee made no
contributions to O.A.S.D.I., however, the five lowest years may be dropped out in
making the computations.

~-

This problem of no salary credits for years in which no contributions to
O.A.S.D.I. have been made was taken into account in the provisions for combining
O.A.S.D.I. with public employee retirement systems. It was recognized that man;y
public employees covered by a retirement system probably would not have _O.A.S.D.I.
coverage during the period from January 1, 1951, until the date when the System
was combined with O.A.S.D.I. Since the five lowest years may be dropped out in
computing O.A.S.D.I. retirement benefits, provision has been made to back date
O.A.S.D.I. coverage to January 1, 1956, for public employees who choose to combine
~...their retirement systems with O.A.S.D.I.
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In order to be eligible for the back dating provision, the a'greement for
prov;i.ding O,A.S,D.I. coverage for members of public employees' retirement systems
can be dated no later than December 31, 1959. In other words, unless such an
agreement is signed within the specified time, maximum O,A.S.D.I, retirement
benefits connnensurate with salary cannot be provided for members of a public
employees' retirement system. While this time period was extended in 1957,
Congress may show reluctance to extend it aey further.
Methods of Combining O,A,S~D,I, With
a Public Employees 17tetirement System
There are three basic ways in which'. O.A.S.D.I. may be merged with a public
employees• retirement system.

l) Offset - The retirement plan is fused with O.A,S,D~I. so that present
retirement plan benefits would be directly offset by socia1 security benefits,
A complete merging of benefits and contributions is generally achieved, Consequently, as O,.A.S.D.I. benefits and contribution rates increase, the retirement
plan benefits .and contribution rates decrease in the same proportion.
2) Supplementation - O.A.S.D.I, benefits are superimposed upon the present
retirement system, with the present benefits to be maintained in full measure
without change. The benefits and contribution rates of the present system are
continued at the existing level with O.A,S.D.I. benefits and contributions added,
3) Coordination - O,A,S,D,I. is combined with an adjusted retirement plan.
The present retirement plan would be revised downward-with respect to benefits and
contributions, although not necessarily in the same amount as O.A.S.D.I. benefits
and contribution rates. Consequently, the total retirement benefits might be more
than those presentzy provided by the retirement without combination with O,A.S.D.I,,
but less than those which would be provided through full supplementation. Contribution rates, at least at the present, would usually be maintained at a level slightly
higher than those for the retirement system prior to the O.A.S.D.I. adjustment. In
the future, contribution rates·would increase as O,A.S.D.I~ rates increased, because
there would be no further downward revision in the present retirement system, either
in contribution rates or benefits.
Freezing of Earned Credits
In combining by either the offset or coordination methods, a decision must be
made-as to whether cr~dits earned before merging with O,A.S.D.I. should be frozen.
If these credits are frozen, employees would get full credit under the old retirement.plan formula for all service rendered prior to the merging of the plan with
O,A.S,D.I, Credits earned for service after the plans are combined would be
computed according to the new formula and added to those frozen to compute the total
retirement benefit. If credits already earned are not frozen, service under the old
plan will be recomputed according to the new formula, so that service rendered both
before and after combination with O.A.S.D.I. will be computed in the same way.
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When earned credits are frozen it increases the cost of the retirement plan,
because benefits are increased for those employees who had prior service credit.
It also means that all present employees will retire with a higher benefit than
those hired in the future, all of whose service credit would be computed according
to the new formula. The freezing of credits, however, makes it unlikely that any
member of the present retirement system would contest combination with O.A.S.D.I.
because of :unpairment of benefits already earned. It also makes combination
especially advantageous to older employees with considerable service under the old
retirement plan.
Advantages and Disadvantages
The chief advantage to an offset plan is its low cost. Its major disadvantage
is that it ties the local retirement system very closely to O.A.S.D.I. Any adjustment in o.A.S.D.I. must be reflected by an opposite adjustment in the local
retirement sys1em. This has the effect of placing the responsibility for local
retirement policy in Washington. Employees usually object to an offset plan,
because it provides them with approximately the same benefits they had before
combination with O.A.S.D.I. at a higher contribution rate. Arry further increase in
O,A,S.n.r. benefits do not result in higher benefits for employees under an offset
plan, because the local retirement system benefits are reduced by the same amount.

-

Full supplementation provides greatl._v increased benefits, but at a much higher
contribution rate. This rate will continue to increase as the O.A.S,D.I. contribution rate goes up. It is the most expensive method of combining with O.A.S.D.I.
Maey employers oppose full supplementation, because of the greater cost. Employees
look with favor upon the benefits, but also object to the high contribution rates.

~

A coordinated plan is usually more expensive than offset, but less costly than
full supplementation. It has the advantage of not being tied so closely to O.A.S.D.I.
that local retirement policy is dictated by changes in O.A.S.D.I. It may offer
benefits slightl.;y in excess of those under the local plan before combination. Any
further increase in O.A.S.D.I.'benefits are realized by the employees, because local
retirement benefits are not reduced.

)

Thus far, it has been assumed that O.A.S,D.I. will be added in some way to the
present retirement plan modified for such purpose. It is also possible to set up a
completely new and separate retirement plan providing for combination with O.A.S,D.I.
This method has certain advantages in that aey inadequacies or inequities of the
present plan can be eliminated in the new one, and.the new plan can be actuarial:cy
conceived to blend in with O.A.S,D.I. in the way desired, rather than merely grafted
on to the existing plan. It would also eliminate the necessity of a vote of the
employee members of the present plan to put it into operat'ion, and would avoid the
imposition of O.A.S.D.I. benefits upon those who did not want them.
If such a plan were considered, it would be necessary for the state to be
included among those which may have two retirement systems under Section 218 or the
Social Security Act. If this were done, all new employees would be required to
become members of the new system. Old employees could switch over if they chose,
but their prior service credits would be recomputed according to the new ]1711an
formula. Only those employees who would gain more through O.A.S.D.I. coverage than
they would lose through a recomputation of their credits would likely transfer to
the new plan.
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Combination With O.A.S.D.I. In Other States
Thirty-three states have combined their retirement programs for state employees
with o.A.S.D.I. Thirteen of these states have set up coordinated plans; 10 have
provided for full supplementation; and the remainder have integrated plans providing
for total or partial offset. Teacher retirement . plans in 27 states have been
combined with O.A.S.D.I. Fifteen have full supplementation, seven have a coordinated
plan, and five have some .form of integration. At least some local government
employees in 30 states have their retirement plans combined with O.A.S.D.I. In 12
states supplementation plans have been authorized, seven states have authorized
coordinated systems, and three states have authorized offset plans. The remain9er
have separate plans in which more than one method of combination has been used.

/

Following is a breakdown of states according to the categories of employees
covered under combined planst4
State Employees, Local Government Employees and Teachers: Alabama, Indiana,
Maryland, . Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New "York,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin.
California, Delaware,
and Virginia
State Employees and Teachers Only:
Wyoming.
State Employees Only:

Connecticut.

1!.ocal Government Employees Only:
Teachers Only:

3.

Arizona, North Dakota, South Carolina and

Illinois, KentuckY,, Louisiana, and Mississippi.

Idaho, Kansas, Missouri.

O.A.S.D.I., The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
AFL-CIO, March 1, 1958
Severa~ states also have combined coverage for university and college employees.
These 1ncluder Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oklahoma Tennessee Te:xas
Vermont, Washington and West Virginia
'
'
'
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III

SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO COMBINE P.E.R.A. AND O.A.S.D.I.
Without specific proposals to examine as to costs and benefits, it is
impossible to determine satisfactorily whether it is desirable to combine
P.E.~.A. and O.A.S.D.I. Three bills have been introduced in recent years
in the General Asse~bly to permit referenda for the purpose of combining
P.E.R.A. and O.A.S.D.I., but these proposals were not evaluated acturia,lly
as to costs and benefits prior to their introduction.1
These bills failed to pass; further discussion of combination prior
to this study by the Legislative Council Committee on Public Employees
Retirement was limited to general pros and cons. Recognizing that a good
case could be made both for and against combination d-epending on viewpoints
and initial assumptions, the committee had several methods of combination
actuarially evaluated to provide a factual basis for discussion. 2
These proposals included:

1)

full supplementation, the most expensive method of combination;

2)

full offset, the least expensive method of combination;

3) a coordinated plan in which P.E.R.A. benefits are reduced at age
65, with the effect that the total benefit is slightly higher than under
P.E.R.A. alone; and
4) a new retirement plan based on 30 years of service and coordinated
with O.A.S.D.I.
In evaluating these proposals, the connnittee specified that no present
employee should_ receive less under a combination plan tha,n pe would receive
under p:.E.R.A. In all proposals except the new 30-year plan, present P.E.R.A.
provisions for retirement prior to age 65 were continued, with adjustment
for O.A.S.D.I. primary insurance benefits to be made at age 65. The request
also was made' that the offset and coordinated plan be evaluated in two ways:
first, without earned credits frozen; and second, with earned credits frozen.
In all proposals, it was assumed that O.A.S.D.I. coverage for employees who
are elrendy members of P.E.R.A. would be backdated to 1-1-56.

1.
2.

H.B. 84 and H.B. 103, 40th General Assembly, 1st Session, 1955; S.B. 208,
41st General Assembly, 1st Session, 1957.
These actuarial evaluations were made by A. G. Gabriel, P.E.R.A. ·system
actuary. The committee was assisted in preparing these proposals for
evaluation by F. Leighton Exel, actuary, Coates, Herfurth & England.
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Backdating would apply only to those present P.E.R.A. members who decide
to join the combination plan. If the state did not have authorization to
have a two-part retirement system, backd~ting of O.A.S.D.I. coverage would
be necessary for all employees in the retirement system divisions in which
a majority of employees voted for a combination plan. With a two-part
retirement system, backdating would apply only to those present P.E.R.A.
employees who decide to join the combination plan. New employees would have
their O.A.S.D.I. coverage begin upon entrance into the combination plan,
so backdating would .not apply. The cost of backdating, therefore, would be
determined by the number of present P.E.R.A. members who chose coverage under
the combined plan. If all present employees in the state division transferred
to a combination plan, the cost of backdating the employer's share alone of .
O.A.S.D.I. to 1-1-56 would be between three million and four million dollars.
There are several possible ways in which the cost of backciating could
met. The necessary funds could be taken from both· the employers' and
employees' contributions already made. If a two-part system were set up,
however, it might not be legally possible to transfer employer contributions
to the combined plan, although employee contributions could be transferred
for those employees who choose a combined plan. Even if the transfer of
employer contributions were possible for those employees who select the
combined plan, it might not be advisable. As the executive secretary of
P.E.R.A. points out, it might be better to leave these employer contributions
in the P.E.R.A. portion of a two-part system to insure that there would be
sufficient assets for those members who decide to remain in P.E.R.A.
be

If only the employee contributions for those who choose the combined
plan are transferred, it would be possible to use a portion to pay both the
employees' and employers' share of backdating. The employees who transferred
to the combined plan would then be credited for their payment of the employers'
share which would ultimately be replaced through employer contributions.
Another possible method of paying the employer's share of backdating would be
through a general appropriation. However, this would prove expensive to
many school districts and municipalities and as indicated above might cost
the state between three and four million dollars.
Basic Provisions of the Combination Plans
Full Supplementation. This plan is similar to P.E.R.A. in every respect
except that O.A.S.D.I. benefits would be added to P.E.R.A. benefits at age
65. An employee who retired prior to age 65 would receive the same benefit
he would have received under P.E.R.A. At age 65 he would continue to receive
his P.E.R.A. benefit plus his O.A.S.D.I. benefit. Umer this proposal, an
employee would be eligible for disability benefits and survivorship benefits
urder both P.E.R.A. and O.A.S.D.I.
Offset (earned credits not frozen). 'lhis plan is generally similar to
P.E.R.A. with three exceptions: 1) O.A.S.D.I. survivorship benefits are
subtracted from P.E.R.A. benefits; 2) O.A.S.D.I. disability benefits are
added to P.E.R.A. disability benefits; and 3) benefits would be the same
as P.E.R.A. for retirement before age 65. At age 65, P.E.R.A. benefits
would be reduced by the amount of the O.A.S.D.I. primary insurance benefit.

- 34 -

Eligibility for the O.A.S.D.I. spouse's benefit would have no effect on the
amount of the P.E.R.A. benefit to be received at age 65. In the instance
that an employee has not worked five years under P.E.R.A. at the time of his
retirement, he would receive his O.A.S.D.I. benefit in addition to the
actuarial equivalent of his contributions to P.E.R.A. In other words, he
would receive a P.E.R.A. benefit equal to the value of his contribution plus
interest i:n addition to his O.A.S.D.I. primary benefit. As credits already
earned are not frozen, prior service would be recomputed according to the
new formula at age 65.
Offset (earned credits frozen). This plan is the same as the offset
plan above except that credits already earned would be frozen. The new formula
would apply only to service after the date the plan goes into effect. For
example, an employee with 10 years prior service who retired with 20 years
service at age 65 would recieve a benefit equal to one-half the P.E.R.A.
benefit (first 10 years, earned credits frozen) plus the actuarial equivalent
of the second 10 years P.E.R.A. contributions plus O.A.S.D.I. primary insurance
benefit. If the total of the three were less than the normal P.E.R.A. benefit
for similar service, his P.E~R.A. benefit would be increased in the amount
needed to equal the normal P.E.R.A. benefit when added to the O.A.S.D.I.
primary benefit. The O.A.S.D.I. spouse's benefit, if payable, would be in
addition.
Coordination (earned credits not frozen). This plan is also similar
except that O.A.S.D.I. survivorship benefits are substituted for
P.E.R.A. survivorship benefits. Disability benefits would be provided by
both plans. Retirement benefits prior to age 65 are computed in the same
way as P.E.R.A. at present. At age 65, P.E.R.A. benefits would be computed
according to the following formula; one per cent of the first $4,800 of final
coverage salary times the number of years of service not to exceed 20 plus
2.5 per cent of the amount of final average salary above $4,800 times the
years of service not to exceed 20 plus the O.A.S.D.I. primary insurance
benefit. The O.A.S.D.I. spouse's benefit, if payable, would be additional.
As earned credits are not frozen, prior service would be recomputed at age
65 according to the above formula. In no instance, however, would the combined
P.E.R.A. - O.A.S.D.I. total be less than the :amount which ,rnuld have been
received under the regular P.E.R.A. formula.
to

"
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P.E.R.A.

Coordination (earned credits frozen). '!his plan is the same as
coordination above except that credits already received under P.E.R.A. would
be frozen and would not be computed according to the new formula at age 65.
The new formula would apply only to future service. For example, an emplo1ee
with 20 years service at age 65, 10 of which were prior to the initial dafe
of the combined plan would receive an annuity according to the following formula:
one-half P.E.R.A. benefit (10 years prior service) plus one per cent of final
avera~e salary below $4,800 times 10 years service plus 2.5 per cent of final
average salary (if any) above $4,800 times 10 years service plus O.A.S.D.I.
primary annuity, with the O.A. S.D.I. spouse's benefit if payable, in addition.
New Retirement Plan. The new retirement plan is based on a career concept
of 30 years service and retirement at age 65. The benefit formula was
devised to blend in with the O.A.S.D.I. primary benefit. Retirement benefits

are computed according to the following formula at age 65: .67 per cent of
the first $4,800 of final average salary times years of service, with no
limit plus 1.67 per cent of final average salary above $4,800 times years of
service, with no limit plus O.A.S.D.I. primary benefit. The O.A.S.D.I.
spouse's benefit, if payable, would be additional. Retirement before age
65 is possible, but ~ould be discouraged through the provision that the
annuity paid for early retirement would be the actuarial equivalent of the
same annui'ty at age 65. For example, an employee retiring at age 60 would
receive the same total annuity (except for O.A.S.D.I.) that he would receive
at age 65, except that it would be apportioned over his longer life
expectancy. 'Ihe monthly benefit he would receive would be approximately
two-thirds of what he would have received for the same amount of service
at age 65. If he retired at age 55 with 30 years service, his monthly
annuity would be approximately 47 per cent of what he would have received
for the same a11X>unt of service at age 65.
Other benefits of the new retirement plan would be similar to P.E.R.A.
except that O.A.S.D.I. survivorship benefits would be substituted for
similar benefits under P.E.R.A.
Deferred annuities as provided in P.E.R.A. are incorporated in all of
the combination proposals except that they would be computed according to
each plan's formula at age 65. Members who leave covered service and are
not eligible for a deferred annuity or who do not choose to avail themselves
of such benefits would be entitled to refunds of all contributions except
for those made of O.A.S.D.I'. Except for the new retirement plan, these
refunds would be made without interest, the same as the present P.E.R.A.
provision. The new retirement plan provides for refunds at the interest
rate assumed for the system -- in this instance, 2.5 per cent.
Contribution Rates, Costs and Benefits
The contribution rates and costs for all of the combined plans will
higher than P.E.R.A., eventually, if not at present. 'Ihe scheduled rate
increases for O.A.S.D.I. will increase the contribution rates, over existing
rates for all plans, including the offset plans. Employee contribution
rates and benefits under each plan are the same for the state, school, and
municipal divisions. Employer contribution rates for each plan vary somewhat
from division to division. Employer contribution rates were computed
with two different assumptions: 1) that only the interest on the unfunded
liability would be financed annually; and 2) that the unfunded liability
would be amortized over a 35 year period.

be

Table III shows the state division contribution rate comparison for
both employer and employees· for P.E.R.A. and the selected combination plans.
The years 1959 and 1969 are used in the comparison to show: 1) the initia1
contribution rate for each plan; and 2) the contribution rate for each plan
when O.A.S.D.I. contribution rates reach the scheduled maximum of 4.5 per
cent. Employer contributions shown in Table III include the contribution
rate necessary to meet only the annual interest payments on the accrued
unfunded liability.
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Table III
State Division
Employee and Employer Contribution Rates,a P.E.R.A.
Compared with Selected Plans for Combining P.E.R.A. and O.A.S.D.I.
1959 and 1969
1959

Employeeb

Employerc

6.00%

6.70%

P.E.R.A.
O.A.s.n.I.
Total

6.00
2.50
8.50%

9.11%

3.

Offset Totalf

6.00%

4.

Offset (E.C.F.)d Totalf

5.
6.

1.

Employee

i969

Employerc

6.00%

6.70%

6.87

6.00

2.24

4.50

10.50%

6.87
4.03
10.90~;

5.15%

6.00%

7.34%

6.00%

6.03%

6.00%

s.22%

Coordination Totalf

s.00%

6.30%

7.00%

8.09%

Coordination (E.c.r.td
Total

5.00%

6.90%

7.00%

8.69%

5.50%

5.62%9

7 .so%

7 .41%8

P.E.R.A.

2. Full Supplementation

7.

---------New Retirement Plan Totalf

·

a.

-·

Employer rates based on financing the interest only on unfunded accrued
liabilities.
b. Employee rates shown for combined plans apply to first $4,800 of salary.
Contribution rate of 6 per cent 011 salary above $4 ,BOO for all combined
plans.
c. Employer O.A.S.D.I. contribution rates are weighted per cents of full
payroll based on June 30 1 1958 payroll.
d. E.C.F. - earned credits frozen.
e. These rates are approximations only; actual rates will be based on the
number of present employees who transfer to the new plan. The assumption
is made that the employer would also contribute at the same rate for
those employees who remain under P.E.R.A. While a portion of the
contribution rate would apply to O.A.S.D.I. under the new plan, the total
rate would apply to P.E.R.A.
f. Including O.A.S.D.I.

The offset combination (as was discussed above) presents the least expensive
method of combining P.E.R.A. and O.A.S.D.I. and full supplementation represents
the most expensive. In 1959, the two coordinated plans and the new retirement

plan have the lowest contribution rates for employees. As O.A.S.D.I.
contributions increase so do the employee contribution rates, so that they
will be one per cent higher on the first $4,800 in 1969 and in the years
following than either of the offset plans or P.E.R.A.
Employee rates for the offset plan stay at six per cent, because increases
in O.A. S.D.I. contributions are reflected in a proportionate decrease in
contributions to P.E.R.A. Since O.A.S.D.I. rates are added to P.E.R.A •
.untler full supplementation, the employee would begin by contributing 8.5
per cent, and his contributions would increase to 10.5 per cent in 1969.
Employer contribution rates are lowest in 1959 for the offset plan,
without earned credits frozen; 1.45 per cent less than the current rate
for P.E.R.A. In 1969, this rate would increase to 7.34 per cent or .64 per
cent more than the current P.E.R.A. rate. The cost effect of freezing
credits can be seen in the comparison between the two· offset plans and
between the two coordinated plans. In 1959, the employer would have to
contribute .88 per cent more' if earned credits were frozen under the offset
plan, and .6 per cent more if earned credits were frozen under the coordinated
plan. This increase also obtains to 1969 and the years following.
The employer's contribution rate for the new retirement plan is
approximated at 1.08 per cent less than P .E.R.A. in 1959, but • 71 per
cent higher in 1969.
The comparison of contribution rates for school and municipal division
employers is shown in Table IV. Employee contributions remain the same
for all three divisions am are as shown for state employees in Table III.
The same variations which were shown in the state division's employer
contributions also appear in the rates for school and municipal employers,
although the rates are somewhat different.
The contribution rates for the school and municipal divisions include
the rate necessary to mee't the interest payments on the accrued unfumed
liability. The contribution rates for the municipal division include the
rate, necessary to amortize the unfumed accrued liability over a period
of 15.2 years.
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Table IV
Employer Contribution Rates, School and Municipal Divisions, P.E.R.A.
Compared with Selected Plans for Combining P.E.R.A. and O.A.S.D.I.a
1959 and 1969
1959

Schoolb
1.

P.E.R.A.

2.

Full Supplementation

1969

Municipalb

6.52%

b

Schoolb

Municipal

6.52%

5.03%

4.24

5.49

O.A.S.D.I.
Total

6.68
2.40
9.08%

5.49
2.35
7 .84%

6.68
4.32
11.001:

3.

Offset Totale

4.48%

4.24%

7.10%

4.

Offset (E.C.F.)C Totale

5.20%

4.35%

7.42%

6.

Coordination Tota18

4.95%

7.91%

6.

Coordination (E.C.F.)C
Tota18

5.17%

8.35%

7.06%

7.

New Retirement Plan Total8

4.01%1

6.87"1

5.90%1

a.

Employer O.A.S.D.I. contribution rates are weighted per cents of full
payroll based on June 30, 195B payrolls.
Employer rates based on financing the interest only on unfunded accrued
liability.
E.C.F. - earned credits frozen.
These rates are approximations only; actual rates will be based on the
number of present employees who transfer to the new plan. The assumption
is made that the employer would also contribute at the same rate for those
employees who remain under P.E.R.A. While a portion of the contribution
rate would apply to O.A.S.D.I. under the new plan, the total rate would
apply to P.E.R.A.
Including O.A.S.D.I.

P .E .R .A.

b.

c.
d.

-·
e.

9.73~
6.53%

The employer contribution rates for the state and school divisions would
considerably higher if the accrued unfunded liability were amortized over
a 35-year period. Once the unfunded liability is amortized, however, assuming
no further increase, there would be a sizeable decrease in employer contribution
rates. Table V shows the employer contribution rate comparisons between
P.E.R.A. and the combination plans for the state and school division if the
.accrued unfunded liability is amortized over a 35 year period.
be
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Table V
Employer Contribution Rate$, State, School Divisions,
Accrued Unfunded Liability Amortized Over 35 Year Period, P.E.R.A.
Compared with Selected Plans for Combining P.E.R.A. and O.A.S.D.I.
'
1959, 1969, and 1994
1959
State ~hool

,1969
State---School

1994
Stat;--School

1.

P.E.R.A. Totalc

7.98%

6.99%

7.98%

6.99%

4.94%

5.87%

2.

Full Supplementation
Totalc 10.51%

9.67%

12.30%

11.59%

8.97%

10.19%

a.

Offset Totalc

5.58%

4.48%

7.81%

7 .10% ·

6.69

7.09%

4.

Offset (E~C.F.) 8
Totalc

7.07%

5.41%

9.30%

7.63%

6.74%

7.13%

s.·

Coordination Totalc

7.10%

6.12%

8.89%

8.04%

6.98%

7.74%

6.

Coordination (E.C.F.)a
TotalC 8.07%

6.84%

9.86%

8.76%

7.08%

7.80%

5.53%

8.71%

7.45%

5.62%

6.08%

7.

New Retirement Planb
Totalc

a.
b.

c.

6.92%

E.C.F. - earned credits frozen.
Costs are approximate.
Including O.A.S,D.I.

If the unfunded accrued liability is amortized over a 35-year period instead
of financing the interest annually state employer contribution rates would be
from .47 per cent (offset) to 1.4 per cent (full supplementation) higher in both
1959 and 1969. If the unfunded liability is retired in 1994, state employer
contribution rate decreases would range from .65 per cent (offset) to 1.93 per
cent (full supplementation).
Comparative figures for the school division show a contribution increase
· range from .13 per cent (coordination) to .59 per cent (full supplementation).
There would be no rate increase for amortizing the unfunded liability under the
offset plan with no earned credit frozen.
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Municipal employer contribution rates amortizing the accrued unfunded
liability over a 35-year period are shown below. Along with the rate reduction
in 1994:

1969

P.E.R.A.

5.55%

Fu11 Supplementa·tion
0ff1tet

8.18

Offset .
(earned credits frozen)
Coordination
Coordination
(earned credits frozen)
New Retirement Plan

1969
5.55~
10.07

1994
6.03%

9.27

4.24

e.5a

4.41

6.70
6.84

6.56

7 .17

6.90
5.52

4.95

5.28
4.29

6.18

6.53
6.84

Retirement Annuitl Benefits
The ' retirement annuities which would be received under the various
combined plans are compared in Table VI for employees with 20 years of
service or more at aRe 65. These annuities are shown for employees with
different final average sala~ies, ranging from $250 to $600 . per month.
The O.A.S.D.I. primary insurance benefit is based upon avera~e salary
durin~ the period contributions were made to O.A.S.D.I. This average
was computed according to actuarial tables.a The spouse's benefit, if
payable, would be in addition to the totals shown in the table.

-·

3.

Actuarial Valuation Members and Annuitants o • cit. p. S4J the
o .A .s.D •• summary ennui ty for sc_h ool d~v1s1on employees would .be .
slightly higher than the amount~ shown 1n Table VI because of a higher
average career salary at each final average salary than state and

municipal employees.

Table VI
Annuity Benefit Co111parison, P.E.R.A. and Selected Combination Plans
Employees with 20, 25 1 30 1 and 35 Years Service at Age 65
'
Exclusive of Spouse's. Benefit
Retirement l'lan

P,E,R,A,

$250M
o.A,S,D.I,
Primary

1, P,E.R,A, (Present Plan)

$125

2, Full Supplementation

$125

3, Offset

4. Offset (E,C,F,) 8
Prior Service: None
5 years
10 years
15 years
20 years

$ 41
$ 69
$ 97
$125

$ 95

5, Coordination

$ 50

6, Coordination (E,C,F,)a
Prior Service: None
5 years
10 years
15 years
20 years

-r.

Total

P,E.R,A,

$300M
o.A,S,D,I,

Total

P,E.l!.,A,

$150

$175

Primary

$350
O,A,S.,D.I,
Primary

Total
$175

$125

$150

$ 93'

$218

$150

$104

$254

$175

$114

$289

$ 32

$ 93

$125

$ 46

$104

$150

$ 61

$114

$175

$ 32

$ 93
$ 94

$ 46
$ 83
$117
$150

$104
$104
$105
$105
$105

$150
$153
$188
$222
$255

$ 61
$ 60

95

$125
$135
$163
$19a
$220

$ 97
$137
$175

$114
$115
$116
$116
$116

$175
$175
$213'
$253
$291

$ 93

$143

$ 60

$104

$164

$ 70

$114

$184

$ 93

$143
$162
$181
$201
$220

$ 60
$ 83
$105
$128
$150

$104
$104
$105
$105
$105

$164
$187
$210
$233
$255

$ 70
$ 97

$114
$115
$116
$116
$116

$184
$212
$238
$265
$291

$126
$135
$142
$149

$ 40
$ 50
$ 60
$ 70

$104
$103
$102
$102

$144
$153
$162
$172

$ 47

$114
$113
$112
$112

$161
$171
$182
$194

$500M
o":'i\3,D,I,
Primary

Total

P,E,R,A,

$SOOK
~.D.I.
Primary

Total

$250

$300

$ 50

$ 94
$

$ 68
$ 87
$106
$125

$ 94

$ 33
$ 42
$ 50
$ 58

$ 93
$ 93

$ 94

$ 95
$ 95

$ 49

$122
$149
$175

New Retirement Planb

Future Service:

20 years

25 years
30 years
35 years

Retirement Plan
(Present Plan)

$ 92
$ 91

$400M
P.E,R.A, o::t:"S".D.I,
Primary

Total

P.E,R,A.

$200

$250

$ 58
$ 70
$ 82

1~

P.E.R,A,

2,

Full Supplementation

$200

$125

$325

$250

$127

$377

$300

$127

$427

3,

Offset

$ 75

$125

$200

$123

$127

$250

$173

$127

$300

$ 75
$ 75

$200
$200
$237
$283
$327

$123
$123
$142
$198
$250

$127
$127
$127
$127
$127

$250
$250
$269
$325
$377

$173
$173
$173
$236
. $300

$127
$127
$127
$127
$127

$300
$300
$300
$363
$427

S200

$300

Offset (E,C.F.)a
Prior Service: None
5 years
10 years
15 years
20 years

$111
$156
$200

$125
$125
$126
$127
$127

5,

Coordination

$ 80

$125

$205

$130

$127

$257

$180

$127

$307

8.

Coor~ination (E.C.F.) 8
Prior Service: None
5 years
10 years
15 years
20 years

$ 80
$110
$140
$170
$200

$125
$125
$126
$127
$127

$205
$235
$266
$297

$130
$160
$190
$222
$250

$127
$127
$127
$127
$127

$257
$287
$317
$349

$180
$210
$240
$270

$377

$300

$127
$127
$127
$127
$127

$307
$337
$367
$397
$427

$ 53
$ 67

$125
$124
$123
$122

$178
$191
$203
$215

$ 86

$127
$127
$127
$127

. $213
$236
$257
$278

$120
$150

$127
$127
$127
$127

$247
$277
$307
$337

· 4,

7,

$3ZT

New Retirement Plan
Future Service:

20 years
25 years
30 years
35 years

$ 00

$ 93

$109

$130
$151

$180
$210

a)

E.C.F. - earned credits fro~en

b)

Would be applicable to all employees hired in 1959 or later and to those present P,E,R.A.
members who wished to come into the new plan, All other P.E,k.A, -mbers could remain
under the present plan if they wished.

Several items in Table VI are worthy of note:

1. For all plans except the new retirement plan, maximum benefits are
received with 20 years service at age 65.
2. The plan which provides the largest annuity is full supplementation.
This plan is also the most costly. However, if earned credits are frozen,
employees with 20 years prior service would receive approximately the same
amount urxter offset, coordination, and full supplementation.
3. Under both offset and coordirotion with earned credits frozen,
employees with five or more years of prior service will receive larger
annuities than under P.E.R.A. This explains why the offset and coordination
plans with earned credits frozen are more expensive than the same plans
without this provision.

4.

The new retirement plan provides benefits equal to P.E.R.A. for

20 years service at ap:e 65 only for those employees with a final average

salary of $250 per month. With 25 years service, benefits are similar
or ·slightly more than P.E.R.A. for employees with a final average salary
of $350 per month or less. With 30 years af service or more, benefits
under this new retirement plan exceed those under P.E.R.A. for all employees
with .final average salaries shown in the table.

5. Under both coordinated plans and the new retirement plan, the
employees with less than $400 per month final average salary benefit the
most in comparison with P.E.R.A. 1his relationship results from the
$4,800 limit on O.A.S.D.I., arxi the fact that O.A.S.D.I. is weighted toward
providing benefits for employees with lower incomes.

"

-·

Age 65, Five and Ten Years' Service. O.A.S.D.I. combination plans
would be especially advantageous for those employees who reach their 65th
birthday with 10 years' service or less. Under P.E.R.A., the employees
with five years' service at age 65 are entitled to an annuity equal to
one-eighth of final average salary. With 10 years' service at age 65,
they are entltled to an annuity equal to one-fourth of final average
salary. Tabies VII and VIII show comparative benefits for P.E.R.A. and
the various combined plans for employees with five and ten year's service
at age 65.
The O.A.S.D.I. primary insurance benefits shown in these tables are
based on the assumption that O.A.S.D.I. coverage began during the period
these employees worked for the state and that such coverage for present
employees was backdated to January 1, 1956. Therefore, the primary insurance
benefit is the maximum that would be possible for the final average
salaries shown in the two tables. For those employees who had O.A.S.D.I.
coverage prior to entering state service, the amount of the primary insurance
benefit would be less if their average salaries throughout their O.A .s.n .I.
coverage were less than the final average salaries shown in the table.
Even if this were the case, annuity benefits would be considerably greater
than under P .E. R.A •

....

The P.E.N.A. benefits shown under the offset plans are the actuarial
equivalents of employees' contributions plus interest. 0.A.S.D.I. spouses'
benefits, if payable, would be in addition to th~ totals shown in Tables
VII and VIII on pages 45 and 46.
Retirement, Prior to age ss·. Annuity benefits for retirement at age
60 with 20 years service 1-rnuld be the same for P.E.R.-A. and all combination
plans except the new retirement plan. All of the combined plans except the
new retirement plan provide for retirement prior to age 65 in the same way
that P.E.R.A. does at present. The formulae for computing benefits under
these combination plans do not go into effect until annuitants reach age 65.
The new retirement plan provides an annuity for retirement before age 65
which is the actuarial equivalent of the same annuity at. ag~ 65. In other
words, an employee who retires with 20 years' service at age·6o would receive
an annuity of about two-thirds as much monthly as he would have received ·
had he retired with the same number of years of service at age 65.
The above remarks also apply to employees who retire at age 55 with
All of the combination plans, except the new retirement
plan, are similar to P.E.R.A. Under the new retirement plan, an employee
who retires at age 55 with 30 years' service would receive an annuity which
is equal to about 47 per cent per month of the one he would have received
for 30 years service at age 65.
30 years service.

The benefit comparison for P.E.R.A. and the various combination
plans for retirement prior to age 65 are shown in Tables IX and X on
page.47.
Under all plans except P.E.R.A., the annuity benefits will change at
65 for all employees who retired prior to reaching this age. Benefits are
recomputed to allow for combination with 0.A.S.D.I. and the amount of the
0.A.S.D.I. primary insurance benefit. The amount of the 0.A.S.D.I. primary
benefit will depend on the average wage received during the period covered
by 0 .A .S.D .I. An employee who retires prior to age 65 and does not work in
O.A.S.D.I. covered employment after such retirement will receive a lower
0.A.S.D.I. primary insurance benefit, because the uncovered years will
reduce his average salary upon which 0.A.S.D.I. benefits are based.
Under full supplementation, 0.A.S.D.I. benefits 'at age 65 would be
added to the P.E.R.A. annuity established at the time of early retirement.
Under the offset plan, the P.E.R.A. annuity received before age 65 will be
reduced by the amount of the 0.A.S.D.I. primary insurance benefit. This
plan is the only one under which an employee would not be penalized if he
failed to work in 0.A.S.D.I. covered employment after early retirement
under P.E.R.A. The P.E.R.A. annuity would be reduced only by the amount
of the 0.A.S.D.I. primary benefit, so the total benefit would remain the
same. Under the new retirement plan, the 0.A.S.D.I. primary benefit would
'be added to the annuity received prior to age 65.
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Table VII
Annuity Benefit Comparison, P,E.R,A,
and Selected Combi~ation Plans,
Emplovees with Five Years' Service at Age 65
Exclusive of Spoua•'• Ben•fi~
$250M
$300M
P,E,R,A, O·.A,S,D,I, Total
P.E,R,A, O.A.S,D,I, Total
Primary
Primary

Retirement Plan

P.E,lt,A,

$350M
o.A.s.D.I.
Primary

Total

$ 38

$. 44

$105

$143

$ 44

$116

$160

$ 5

$105

$110

$

5

$116

$121

$126

$ 38

$105

$143

$ 44

$116

$160

$ 95

$108

$ 15

$105

$120

$ 18

$116

$134

$ 31

$ 95

$126

$ 38

$105

$143

$ 44

$116

$160

$ 8

$ 95

$103

$ 10

$105

$115

$ 12

$116

$128

1, P,E.R,A, (Present Plan)

$ 31

$ 31

$ 38

2, Full Supplementation

$ 31

$ 95

$126

$ 38

3, Offset

$ 4

$ 95

$ 99

$ 31

$ 95

$ 13

6, Coordination (E.C.F.)
Prior Service1 5 years
7, New Retirement Plan

$ 44

4, Offset (E,C,F,) 11

Prior Servicer 5 years
5. Coordination
11

P.E,R.,A,

Retirement Plan

,.,

-·

,..

$400M
o.1'3.D . I.

$500M

Total

P.E.R.A,

$ 50

$ 63

Primary

~.D,I,
Primary

Total

P.E.R.A,

$ 63

$ 75

$600M
o.A3.D,I.
Primary

Total

1. P,E,R,A, (Present Plan)

$ 50

2. Full Supplementation

$ 50

$127

$177

$ 63

$127

$190

$ 75

$127

$202

a.

$ 6

$127

$133

$ 9

$127

$136

$ 12

$127

$139

$ 50

$127

$177

$ 63

$127

$190

$ 75

$127

$202

$ 20

$127

$147

$ 33

$127

$160

$ 45

$127

$172

6, Coordination (E,C.F.)
Prior Service: 5 years

$ 50

$127

$177

$ 63

$127

$190

$ 75

$127

$202

7, New Retirement Plan

$ 13

$127

$140

$ 22

$127

$149

$ 30

$127

$157

Offset

4, Offset

(F..C.F.) 8

Prior Service: 5 years
5, Coordination

$ 75

8

>

a)

E.C.F. - earned credits frozen.

Table VIII
Anmiity Benefit Comparisons, P.E.R.A. and Selected Combination Plans,
Employees lii th 10 Years' Service at Age 65
Exclusive of Spouse's Banefi t

Retirement Pl.an

P.E.R.A,

$250M
~.D.I.
Primary

Total

P.E.R,A,

~
•• ,D.I.

Total

Primary

$ 63

$ 75

$ 95

$158

$ 75

$ 7

$ 95

$102

$ '7
$ 36

$ 95
$ 95

$ 26

6. Coordination (E.C,F.)
Prior Service: None
6 years
7. New Retirement Pil.an
Future Service:
10 years

$356K
P.E.R.A. 0:-X:S.D.I.
Primary

Total

$ 75

$ 88

$105

$180

$ 88

$116

$204

$ 8

$105

$113

$ 10

$116

$126

$102
$130

$ 8
$ 42

$106
$105

$113
$147

$ 10
$ 49

$116
$116

$126
$165

$ 96

$120

$ 30

$105

$136

$ 35

$116

$151

$ 25
$ 44

$ 95
$ 95

$120
$139

$ 30
$ 52

$105
$105

$135
$157

$ 35
$ 61

$116
$116

$151
$177

$ 17

$ 95

$112

$ 20

$105

$125

$ 23

$116

$139

1. P.E.R,A. (present plan)

$ 63

2. Full Supplementation

$ 63

3. Offset

$ 88

4, Offset (E,C,F.)a

Prior ·s ervices None
6 years
5. Coordination
8

Retireaant Plan

P.E,R,A.

$400K
O,A,S.D.I,
Primary

Total

P.E,R,A,

$100

$125

$SOOK
O.A,S,D,I,
Primary

Total

P.E.R.A.

$125

$150

$600M
O.A.S.D, I.
Primary

Total

1, P.E,R.A, (Present Plan)

$100

2, Full Supplementation

$100

$127

$227

$125

$127

$252

$150

$127 -

$277

3, Offset

$ ll

$127

$138

$ 17

$127

$144

$ 22

$127

$149

$ 11
$ 56

$127
$127

$138
$183

f 17
71

$127
$127

$144
$198

$ 22
$ 87

$127
$127

$149
$214

$ 40

$127

$167

$ 65

$127

$192

$ 90

$127

$217

$ 40
$ 70

$127
$127

$167
$197

$ 65

6 years

$ 95

$127
$127

$192
$212

$ 90
$120

$127
$127

$217
$247

7, New Retirement Plan
Future Service:
10 years

$27

$127

$154

$ 43

$127

' $170

$ 60

$127

$187

,4. Offset (E,C,F,)a
Prior Service: None

5 years
5, Coordination

6, Coordi111tion (E,C.F ,)•
Prior Service: None

a)

E,C,F, - earned credits frozen,
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$150

l

.

.,

'·

f

, l
·\

"

Table ll
Annuity Benefit Comparisons, P.E.R.A.
and Selected Combination Plans,
Employees with 20 Years' Service at Age 60
$250

1.

P.E.R.A. and All Other Plans Except

Month
$125

2.

New Retirement Plan

$ 22

$300
Month
$150

$350
Month
$175

$400
Month

Month

$200

$250

$600
Month
$300

$ 27

$ 31

$ 35

$ 57

$ 80

$400

$500
Month

$600
1-bnth

$250

$300

$ 61

$. 84

$500

Table X
Annuity Benefit Comparisons, P.E.R.A.
and Selected Combination Plans,
Employees with 30 Years' Service at Age 55
. ....

1.

P.E.R.A. and All Other Plans Except

$250
Month
$125

2.

New Retirement Plan

$ 23

.

~: ......

$300
Month
$150

$350
Month
$175

Month
$200

$ 28

$ 33

$.37

For em loyees who retired rior to a ,e 65 the annuity amount e1.t a·ge
65 wou d be equal to or higher than the present P.E.R.A. annuity under all
combination plans except the new retirement plan. Those employees with
prior service would benefit considerably from either the offset or
coordin~ted plans with earned credits frozen, except that employees with
20 years prior service at age 60 or 30 years prior service at age 55 would
not be able to retire and receive an O.A.S.D.I. annuity unless they worked
elsewhere· in O.A.S.D.I. covered employment between the time of retirement
and age 65. Witho~t this additional covered employment they would not
have a sufficient number of O.A.S.D.I. covered quarters. Tables XI and
XII show the annuity benefits at age 65 for employees who retired at age
60 with 20 years service and for those who retired at a~~ 55 with 30 years
service, see pages .49 and 50. The O.A.S.D.I. primary benefits shown in
these tables are based on the assu~ption that employees who retire before
65 will not work elsewhere in O.A.S.D.I. covered employment. If such employees
should work in O.A.S.D.I. covered employment between retirement and age 65,
the O.A.S.D.I. primary benefits would be larger. Spouses' benefits, if
payable, are in addition to the totals shown in these tables.
P.E.R.A. and Combination Plans:

Some Considerations

No clear-cut case can be imde for: combining or not combining P.E.R.A.
and O.A.S.D.I. There are general advantages which should be considered, as
well as good points and drawbacks to each of the proposed combination
plans. Employers and employees may look at these from different points
of view. Combination may or m?.y not be desirable for a specific employee,
depending on his age, years of service, marital status, salary, sex, and
career aspirations.
In general, a combined plan will not be looked upon too favorably
by employees who plan to retire before ar,e 65, especially those who plan to
work elsewhere in O.A.S.D.I. covered employment. Employees in the higher
salary brackets and women whose husbands are working in O.A.S.D.I. covered
employment also may see 1i ttle desir?bili ty in a combination plan.
Combination with O.A.S.D.I. would be most advantageous to older
employees nearing age 65, married male employees who expect to qualify for
the spouse's benefit, older employees who begin their state or local
government service after a number of years of O.A.S.D.I. coverage, younger
workers who are still more or less transient, and employees in the lower
salary brackets.
Originally, survivorship benefits and continuity of retirement coverage
for non-career employees were among the reasons that combil'lc'tion of O.A.S.D.I.
and P.E.R.A. was advocated. The addition of survivorship benefits to
P.E.R.A. has given O.A.S.D.I. little advantage in this respect. The addition
of deferred annuities to P .E .R.A. minimizes the need of r_etirement coverage
for transient employees, although the value of deferred annuities is
questionable for younger employees with families, who may not be able to
afford deferring a return on their contributions until age 65. Combination
with O.A.S.D.I. is also looked upon favorably because of the spouse's benefit.

Table XI
A111111ity . Benefit Comparisona at A~e 65, P. E. R.A. and Selected Combination Plana,

EmployeP.S who Retired at Age 60 with 20 Years' Service
Exclusive of Spouse's Benefit
$300M
$350M
P.E,R.A, 0.A,S.D,I.
••• D,I, Total P,E.R. A, o.A.S,D.I. Total
P,E.R,A,
Primary
Primary
Primacy

ffl

letirement Plan
1. P.E,R,A. (Present Plan)

$125

2. Full Supplementation

$125

3. Offset

.

.

Total i

$150

$175

$ 90

$240

$175

$ 98

$273

$ 60

$ 90

$150

$ 77

$ 98

$175

$125
$125
$147
$171

$ 60
$ 60
$ 82
$116

$ 90
$ 90
$ 87
$ 80

$150
$150
$169
$196

$ 77
$ 77
$ 95
$135

$
$
$
$

98
98
94
87

$175
$175
$189
$222

$ 82

$132

$ 60

$ 90

$160

$ 70

$ 98

$168

$ 82

$132
$150
$169
$188

$ 60
$ 83
$105
$128

$ 90

$ 82
$ 82
$ 82

$ 90
$ 90
$ 90

$150
$173
$195
$218

$ 70
$ 97
$122
$149

$ 98
$ 98
$ 98
$ 98

$168
$195
$220
$247

$ 82

$104

$ 27

$ 90

$117

$ 31

$ 98

$129

P.E,R.A.

ffl
Primary

$125

$150

$ 82

$207

$150

$ 43

$ 82

$125

$ 43
$ 44
. $ 68
$ 97

$ 82
$ 81
$ 79
$ 74

5, Coordination

$ 50

6, Coordination (E,C.F.) 8
Prior Service: None
5 years
10 years
15 years

$ 50
$ 68
$ 87
$106

7. New Retirement Plan

$ 22

$175

4, Offset (E.C,F,) 8

Prior Service: None
5 years
10 years
15 years

Jletirement Plan
~

A

....

1'.•E,R.A.

1. P ,E .R .~. (Present Plan)

1$200

2. Full Supplementation

$200

3. Offset

-400M
o.T.'s.D • I.
Prh1ary

1

Total
$200

$250

'$107

$307

$250

1.$ 93

$107

$200

4. Offset (E,c.r.)•
Prior Service: None
5 years
10 years
15 years

$ 93
$ 94
$109
$155

$107
$106
$102
$ 93

5, Coordination

$ 80

6, Coordination (E,C.F.)a
Prior Servicd: None
5 years
10 years
15 years
7. New Retir11111ent Plan

a)

Total

P,E,R,A,

m

• .D, I,

Total

Primary

$260

$300

$110

$360

$300

$110

$410

$140

$110

$250

$190

$110

$~00

$200
$200
$211
$248

$140
$142
$147
$194

$110
'$108
$103
$ 94

$250
$250
$250
$Z88

$190
$192
$197
$234

$110
$108
$103
$ 94

$300
$300
$300
$328

$1C17

$187

$130

$110

$240

$180

$110

$290

$ 80
$110
$140
$170·

$107
$107
$107
$107

$187
$217
$247
$277

$130
$160
$190
$222

$110
$110
$110
$110

$240
$270
$300
$332

$180
$210
$240 ·
$270

$110
$110
$110
$110

$290
$320
$350
$380

$ 35

$107

$142

$ 57

$110

$167

$ 80

$110

$190

E.C,F. • earned credits frozen •

.,.
,

• • •D.I.
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$300

Table XII
Annuity Benefit Comparisons at Age 65, P.E.R.A.
and Selected Combination Plans,
Employees ¥.ho Retire at A~e 55 with 30 Years' Service
Exclusive of Spouse's Benefit
$250M

P.E.R.A. O.A.S.D.I. Total

ietire111ent Plan

$300M

P.E.R.A.

Primary

1. P.E.R.A, (Present Plan)

$125

2, Full Supplementation

$125

3. Offset

'o":A.s. D• I.

Total

P.E,R.A,

$150

$175

Primary

$350H
0.A.S.D.I.
Primary

Total

$125

$150

$ 78

$203

$150

$ 05

$235

$175

$ 92

$267

$ 47

$ 78

$125

$ 65

$ 85

$150

$ 83

$ 92

$175

4. Offset (E.C.F.)B
Prior Service: None
5 years
10 years
15 years
20 years

$ 47
$ 48
$ 50
$ 68
$ 87

$ 78

$ 73
· $ 69

$125
$125
$125
$141
$156

$ 65
$ 66
$ 68
$ 81
$104

$
$
$
$

85
84
82
80
$ 76

$150
$150
$150
$161
$180

$ 83
$ 83
$ 86
$ 95
$121

$
$
$
$
$

92
92
89
86
81

$175
$175
$175
$181
$202

5, Coordination

$ 50

$ 78

$128

$ 60

$ 85

$145

$ 70

$ 92

$162

6. Coordination (E.C.F.)a
Prior Servicll: None
5 years
10 years
15 years
20 years

$ 50
$ 71
$ 92
$100
$108

$
$
$
$
$

78
77
75
73
69

$128
$148
$167
$173
$177

$ 60
$ 85
$110
$120
$130

$ 85
$ 84
$ 82
$ 80
$ 76

$145
$169
$192
$200
$206

$ 70
$ 99
$128
$140
$152

$ 92
$ 92
$ 89
$ 86
$ 81

$162
$191
$217
$226
$233

7,

$ 23

$ 78

$101

$ 28

$ 85

$113

$ 33

$ 92

$125

Ne'll'

Retirement Plan

P,E,R,.A.

Retirement Plan

$$400M
O.A.S.D,I.
Primary

Total

$SOOK
P.E.R.A, o.A.S,D.I.
Primary

Total

P.E.R.A,

$250

$300

$600M
o.A.S.D.I.
Primary

Total
$300

$250

$100

$300

$250

$105

$355

$300

$105

$405

$100

$100

$200

$145

$105

$250

$195

$105

$3PO

Offset (E.C .F. )8
Prior Service 1 None
5 years
10 years
15 years
20 years

$100
$101
$104
$108
$138

l

$100
99
96
$ 92
$ 87

$200
$200
$200
1200
225

$145
1146
149
$154 .
$174

$105
$104
$101
$ 96
$ 90

$250
$250
$250
$250
$264

$195
$196
$199
$204
$212

$105
$104
$101
$ 96
$ 90

$300
$300
$300
$300
$302

Coordination

$ 80

$100

$180

$130

$105

$235

$180

$105

$285

Coordination (E.C.F.) 8
Prior Service: None
5 years
10 years
15 years
20 years

$ 80
$113
$147
$160
$173

$100
$ 99
$ 96
$ 92
$ 87

$180
$212
$243
$252
$260

$130
$172
$213
$222
$232

$105
$104
$101
$ 96
$ 90

$235
$196
$314
$318
$322

$180
$230
$200
$285
$290

$105
$104
$101
$ 96
$ 90

$285
$334
$381
$381
$380

New Retirement Plan

$ 37

$100

$137

$ 61

$105

$166

$. 84

$105

$189

P.E.R.A. (Present Plan)

$200

2.

Full Supplementation

$200

3.

Offset

· 6,

$ 75

$200

1.

5.

$ 77

$175

a)

E.C.F, - earned credits f~ozen,
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O.A.S.D.I. is designed to provide minimum retirement standards. Other
retirement systems usually are designed to attract career employees whose
fin~l average salaries are considered a measure of their worth and upon
which retirement benefits are usually based. It is ~rgued that a combination
of the two provides both minimum and maximum retirement limits. Some proponents
of combination plans agree that all employees probably will be covered by
O.A.S.D.I. eventuall;y, so that Colorado should take -this step for its public
employees now at the most advantageous time, while coverage may be backdated to January 1, 1956, which would insure present employees no loss in
O.A.S.D.I. benefits.
On the other hand, it is pointed out that all combination plans are
more costly than P.E.R.A. Some of the present P.E.R.A. provisions are
either incompatible with O.A.S.D.I. or a duplication of benefits. Retirement
before 65 and deferred annuities do not blend in too well with O.A.S.D.I.
P.E.R.A. also provides survivorship benefits similar to O.A.S.D.I., as
well as superior disability benefits.
Perhaps the best way to determine whether combination is desirable
..
is to examine the advantages and disadvantages of P.E.R.A. and the combination
plans from the viewpoint of both the employee and employer.

P.E .R.A.
From the avera~e employee's viewpoint, P.E.R.A. is a more than adequate
retirement plan. Its retirement benefit formula provides a combination of
both the social approach (minimum standards') and the career service approach
to superannuation.
· ·

..

The average employee who retires after 20 years pays, at the most,
less than 30 per cent of his final annuity. He gets a very high return per
dollar of contribution, and the contribution rate is not excessive. Early
retirement is·another employee advantage. Survivorship and disability
benefit.s are also included in the P.E.R.A. package. P.E.R.A. is completely
controlled on the state level, by a board composed primarily of representatives
of the system's membership. Policy decisions and benefit changes may be
made without interference by or dependence on the national government.
In respect to benefits for older employees with relatively few years
of service, it can be argued that P.E.R.A. meets the employer's responsibility
for that portion of working lifetime spent, in public service; any additional
benefits would be unfair to career employees. Employees who leave covered
service are entitled to refunds or deferred annuities if eligible, and
temporary workers are entitled to P.E.R.A. coverage if they become permanent
employees.
The average employee evaluates a retirement program on the basis of
what he contributes and receives. The employer looks at several aspects
including the retirement plan's application to all employees, its cost,
and the effect on personnel policies, recruitment, and retention. The
question has been raised as to whether P.E.R.A. is a career service retirement
program, since no credit is given for more than 20 years service. Early
retirement is possible which could deprive the employer of skilled services
during an employee's most productive period. If the retirement of older

employees is deemed desirable or necessary, then perhaps the retirement·
program should make some additional provision for these employees. The
problem of minimum retirement benefits for older employees with few years
of service becomes even more important if some sort of compulsory retirement
is considered advantageous by the employer. The lack of retirement coverage
under P.E.R.A. for the temporary or casual employee is also of importance
to the employer. ·1ast, but not least, is the fact that the employer is
paying 70 per cent or more of each employee's retirement benefit.
Supplementation
This is the most expensive of the combination plans. It provides the
employee with double coverage for disability and survivorship benefits and
adds O.A.S.D.I., retirement benefits at age 65 to the annuity provided by
P.E.R.A., including the spouse's benefit if payable. It would not interfere
with early retirement, except that failure to work elsewhere in O.A.S.D.I.
covered employment·upon such retirement would result in a lower O,A.S.D.I.
primary benefit at age 65. Employees who plan to retire early (between 55
and 60) and work in O.A.S.D.I. covered employment could receive as high
an O.A.S.D.I, summary retirement benefit as they would um.er a full
supplementation plan, if they had not been covered by O.A.S.D,I. prior
to retirement from P.E.R.A. covered service,
The basic objection to full supplementation is its cost and high
contribution rate by both employer and employees. Older employees nearing
retirement would benefit under full supplement~tion because of the addition
of primary benefits, and it would provide minimum continuous coverage for
transient employees, The employer would continue to contribute the same
proportion of the P.E.R,A. annuity, in addition to a contribution equal
to the employees' for O,A,S.D,I. Twenty years' service at age 65 would
continue to be the standard for ma•ximum benefits.
Offset
This is the least costly of the combined plans, although more expensive
than P.E.R.A. It provides the average employee with the same benefits he
would receive um.er P.E.R.A. plus the spouse's benefit, if payable. It
provides transient employees with continuous minimum retirement coverage.
It does not interfere with early retirement as the employee's benefit will
be the same before and after age 65, because the P.E.R.A. portion is decreased
only by the amount of the O.A.S.D.I. primary benefit. For this reason it
doesn't matter whether the employee works in O.A.S.D.I. covered employment
between his early retirement and age 65. Under the other combination plans,
with fixed formulae at age 65, any decrease in the O.A.S.D.I. primary annuity
would result in a decrease in the total annuity. Older employees with
limited service would benefit under the offset plan because they would have
O.A.S,D.I. benefits to add to their minimum. P.E.R.A. benefits.
The main objections to offset are: 1) P.E.R.A. would be closely integrated
with O.A.S.D.I. to the extent that changes in O.A.S.D.I. would cause changes
in P.E.R.A.; 2) upward revisions in O.A.S.D.I. benefits would not reflect
in increased employee benefits, because P.E.R.A. benefits would be reduced
proportionately; and 3) except for older workers and continuous minimum
coverage for transient workers, none of the existing retirement problems are
corrected.

Coordination
This method of combination provides at a higher cost benefits slightly
in excess of current P.E.R.A. benefits plus the spouse's benefit, if payable.
Earl;( retirement is still possible, but failure of the early-retired employee
to work in O.A.S.D-. I. covered employment elsewhere until age 65 would result
in a lower O.A.S.D.I. primary benefit and co.n sequently a lower total benefit
at age 65. Older employees and transient employees would benefit more
than they do at present under P.E.R.A. (which is true of all combination
plans). The basic P.E.R.A. formula is retained, so that the coordinated
plan does not answer the problem of career service, nor does it adjust
employer-employee proportionate shares of total cost.
New Retirement Plan
This plan, based on 30 years service at age 65, places a greater
proportion of the total cost on the employee (approximately 45 per cent)
and discourages early retirement. Transient employees and older employees
would benefit from O.A.S.D.I. coverage; in addition, transient employees
would have their non O.A.S.D.I. contributions returned with interest.
The new retirement plan gives the employer the opportunity to correct
any existing dissatisfactions with P.E.R.A. Older employe~s would not have
a voice in determining whether the plan should be set up, because the system
can be established for all future employees; however, present employees
could transfer, if they so desired. Career service is recognized through
the 30-year base and the granting of additional. credit for years of service
over and .above 30, with no limit. The new retirement plan costs would be
in excess of P.E.R.A., but less than under any other combined plan except
offset.
Freezing of Earned Credits
Freezing of earned credits is not a consideration under either full
supplementation or the new retirement plan. Under full supplementation,
O.A.S.D.I. is added to P.E.R.A., so credits earned are in effect already
frozen. 1he new retirement plan could be set up for all new employees,
and old employees would transfer only if their previous service as computed
under the new plan formula plus O.A.S.D.I. benefits would exceed the
expected annuity under P.E.R.A.

Under the offset and coordinated plans, the freezing of earned credits
bears serious consideration. If benefits are frozen, present employees will
receive higher annuity benefits -- the amount being proportionate to the
number of years of prior service. Consequently, it would be advantageious
for most present employees -- especially those near retirement -- to transfer
to a combined plan. The costs, as was shown, for the offset and coordinated
plans would be higher with earned credits frozen, and present employees
would receive higher benefits than employees entering covered service in
the future.
Even though it would be more costly, it may

earned credits~ Employees

he

desirable to freeze

are usually less reluctant to supp~r~ ~ combined

plan under such circumstances and it -would eliminate the poss1b1.ll ty of
law suits on the !?f"OUnds that retirement rights have been impaired.
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IV
RETIREMENT PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Six present retirement questions were.enumerated in Chapter I.

In brief

these include:

1) the financing of the interest and/or the amortization of present
accrued unfunded liabilities;
2) the present financing by the employer of 70 to 75 per cent of each
retirement annuity;
3) the lack of retirement coverage for temporary, part-time, and some fulltime employees;

4) the dissatisfaction with P.E.R.A. expressed by three member cities and
their employees;
5) the employees entering P.E.R.A.-covered service at an advanced age,
especially in low salary jobs, who are eligible only for small retirement annuities;
and

6)

the question as to whether P.E.R.A. is a career service retirement plan.

P.E.R.A.
Slould the decision be made not to combine P.E.R.A. and O.A.S.D.I., there are
several things which might be done concerning these problems within the framework
of P.E.R.A.
1) Accrued Unfunded Liability. The employer's contribution rate could be
raised to meet the interest requirement on the unfunded liability and the employers
rate could be increased to amortize the unfunded liability over a period of years.
It would necessitate a contribution rate increase of .7 per cent in the state fund
and ·.52 per cent in the school fund to pay the interest on the unfunded liability.
If a decision were made to amortize the unfunded liability over a period of 35 years,
it would necessitate an employer contribution increase of 1.98 per cent to 7.98 per
cent in the state division, and one of .99 per cent to 6.99 per cent in the school
division.
Any rate increase would necessitate a change in the statutory provision for
employer's contributions. If the intent is to meet the interest only on the unfunded
liability, legislation must be considered which would tie the employers' contribution
rates to the actuarial valuation so that the rate could be adjusted automatically
every five years according to the actuarial valuation results.
·
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2) Employee's Proportion of Hetiremcnt Cos ts. If the General Assembly decides
that the employee should pay a greater proportion of the cost of his annuity, one of
two things could be done. First, the employee's contribution rate could be increased
to more nearly approximate the amount necessary to finance 50 per cent of the annuity.
This would correspond to the erroneous impression currently held by some people that
the fact that both the .employer and employee are contributing six per cent of salary
n1eans that the employee is presently paying half the cost of his annuity. The second
alternative would require a 30 year career base, instead of the existing 20 year base,
in order to qualify for. a full retirement annuity.
3) Lack of Coverage for Some Employees. This is really two problems. One can
be solved by inserting penalties in P.E.R.A. legislation for failure to cover all fulltime permanent employees. If a decision is made to provide O.A.S.D.I. coverage for
those employees not eligible for P.E.R.A., an amendment to the state O.A.S.D.I. .
1
enabling legislation would be needed to extend these statutes to cover such employees.
Then, the present agreement with the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
could be modified in line with the amended state legislation to provide O.A.S.D.I.
coverage for temporary and part-time employees. If this is done a question arises as
to the continuation of O.A.S.D.I. coverage for those temporary and part-time employees
who may eventually become permanent employees eligible for P.E.R.A. If O.A.S.D.I.
coverage is continued, the contribution rates will be higher for both employer am
employee or equal to the costs of full supplementation. This means that the state
will be contributing more for a few employees and that a few employees will receive
greater benefits than =the rest. On the other hand, if O.A.S.D.I. coverage is
terminated for those temporary and part-time employees who become eligible for P.E.R.A.
coverage, there is a question as to the advantage in providing O.A.S.D.I. coverage for
them in the first place.
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4) The Three Cities. In order to allow Arvada, Fort Morgan, and Gunnison to
drop P.E.R.A. coverage and replace it with O.A.S.D.I., the following steps would have
to be taken:
First, amend the state 1 s enabling legislation to specify each of the cities as
a separate retirement plan and to permit a referendum of employees to be held in each
city that so desired to determine whether they want O.A.S.D.I. coverage in addition
to P.E.R.A. Then, further state legislation would be needed to allow the employees
of each of these cities to hold a second referendum to drop P.E.R.A. coverage. If
this were done, these cities could achieve their objective of substituting O.A.S.D.I.
for P.E.R.A. '!here appears to be no other way, because of the provisions of Section
218 of the Social Security Act as amended, in which P .E.R.A. can· be replaced by
O.A.S.D.I. coverage. Section 218 states that public employees whose positions were
covered by a retirement system as of January 1, 1954 cannot obtain O.A.S.D.I. unless
a referendum is held even if these employees are no longer members. Therefore, if
P.E.R.A. coverage were dropped first in these cities, there would be no retirement
system members to vote for O.A.S.D.I. coverage.
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The procedures outlined above create additional problems, however. Very few
employees in Fort Morgan and Gunnison have been enrolled as members of P.E.R.A., so
that these few would be determining the fate of the rest, unless ,these cities
enrolled additional employees prior to the first referendum. A decision would have
to be made as to what should be done about the service credits earned by employees
in these cities who are _presently covered by P.E.R.A. One possibility would be the
provision of a deferred annuity with refunds to those employees who either are not
eligible for a deferred annuitt or do not wish to avail themselves of it. It is
important that some sort of agreement be reached with these employees to avoid any
lawsuits claiming impairment of benefits arising from the two referenda.
5) Older Employees with Limited Covered Service. Unless the P.E.R.A. formula
is drastically altered, there is no way within the framework of the existing retirement system and within sound financing practice in which additional benefits or
coverage could be provided for current older employees nearing retirement with but
a few years of coverage under P.E.R.A. This would become an increasing. problem, if
some method of mandatory retirement after age 65 were considered desirable personnel
policy. In the future this might be remedied by reviewing hiring policies of the
state government.
6) Career Service Aspects of P.E.R.A. P.E.R.A.'s formula could be changed
to a 30-year plan with the granting of additional credit for any years of employment
over 30. This would also result in the employees' paying a larger portion of their
retirement annuities. Early retirement could be discouraged by providing that
employees would receive only the actuarial equivalent of what they would be entitled
to at age 65 for the same number of years of service. These changes would produce a
plan similar to the new retirement plan, except that O.A.S.D.I. coverage and benefits
would not be combined with P.E.R.A. Legislation would be necessary to make these
changes, but they could be made without any vote of the present P.E.R.A. membership.
The new formula would apply to all new employees and for the future service of
present employees.
All Combination Plans Except the New Retirement Plan.
First, the basic decision must be made as to whether P.E.R.A. should be divided
into two parts: one combined with O.A.S.D.I. and the other, P.E.R.A. alone. If it
is decided that a dual system is not wanted, there will be no need to have Colorado
added to the states listed in Section 218 of the Social Security Act as allowed to
have a dual retirement system. If the General Assembly decides to maintain only one
plan, but that one to be a combination plan, all that would be required is amendment
of the present enabling legislation to provide for a referendum and a selection by
the General Assembly of the form of combination:: full supplementation, offset, or
coordination. If either the offset or coordination method is selected, a further
decision would have to be made as -to whether or not to freeze earned credits. The
importance of qualified actuarial and leg8:l assistance ip drawing up the enablins:legislation cannot be stressed too strongly. Actuarially and legally sound enabling
legislation would avoid the pitfalls and complications which have developed in some
other states.
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Under the prov1s1ons of Section 218 of the Social Security Act, the following
portions of P.E.R.A. membership may be deemed separate retirement systems:: state
employees; state patrol; judges; school employees (either as a group or each school
district separately); municipal employees (either as a group or each city separately};
and each institution of higher learning. The state patrol could be excluded from the
referendum under the provisions of Section 218 which exclude police and firemen
unless inclusion of these portions is expressly requested by a state. This means
that the state patrol would maintain its present retirement system.
A possible arranr,ement for Colorado under this provision would appear to be
the establishment of the following as separate retirement systems for referendum
purposes: state employees, highway patrol, judges, school employees, each municipality,
and each institution of higher learning. This breakdown would give the membership of
each municipality and college the opportunity of deciding for itself whether to
combine, without having the larger membership of certain municipalities and colleges
decide the fate of combination for the whole group. It would also make it possible
for the state division and school division to vote independently, am the vote of
their large ~emberships would not decide the fate of combination for the municipalities
•and colleges.

:s

Split System.

.

Serious thought should be given, however, to having Colorado added to the list
of states which may have a divided retireDJent system. The chief disadvantage would
be the burden of administerin~ a number of separate retirement systems. The advantages
appear to outweigh the disadvantages, however. Each employee would be able to choose
the combination plan or to retain membership in P.E.R.A., according to which would be
best for him. The majority could choose the plan it wished without affecting the
desires of the minority. With a divided system there would be no need for freezing
earned credits, because an employee would not have to transfer to the combination
plan unless it was to his advantage, meaning that P.E.R.A. benefits recomputed
according to the combined plan formula plus O.A.S.D.I. benefits would be greater
than the expected benefits under P.E.R.A •
It would also solve the impairment of benefits problem for the three cities
that wish to substitute O.A.S.D.I. for P.E.R.A. The employees of these three
municipalities who wished to retain their P.E.R.A. coverage would be permitted to do so.

.
...

Colorado's Congressional delegation would have to be contacted immediately so
that Colorado could be added to the dual-system states through legislation passed at
this session of Congress. The state enabling legislation would have to be passed at
this session of the 42nd General Assembly to become effective upon the change in
federal legislation. These immediate steps are necessary to insure that an agreement
modification can be signed with the Secretary of Health, Fducation, and Welfare prior
to December 31, 1959, so that O.A.S.D.I. benefits can be backdated to January 1, 1956 •
It is suggested that the same portions of P.E.R.A. mentioned above be deemed separate
retirement systems for the holding of dual-system referenda, namely:: the state division,
state patrol, judges, school division, each municipality, and each institution of
higher learning.
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1. Accrued Unfunded Liability. Under a combined plan set up by either method
outlined above, handling of the accrued unfunded liability would be the same as
under P.E.R,A. without combination.

;..

2. Emplo~•er's Proportion of Retirement Costs. Any combination of P.E.R.A. as
presently constituted and O.A,S.D.I. would leave the proportion of retirement
costs for emplc,yer and employee approximately the same as. at present.
3. Lack of Coverage for Some Employees. Provision of 0,A.S.D.I. coverage for
part-time and temporary employees, as outlined in the section above on P.E.R.A.,
would dovetail with a combined plan in that temporary and part-time employees
who became permanent and eligible for retirement coverage under the combined plan
would be able to continue their O.A.S.D.I. coverage, along with other permanent
employees.
4. The Three Cities. The same procedure could be followed as outlined in the
section on P.E.R.A. above. With a dual system, the cities would run little risk
of impairment of benefit suits, because these employees would be able to stay
under P.E.-R.A,
5. Older Employees with Limited Coverage •. The provision of O.A.S.D.I. through
a combined plan would make it possible for older employees to receive greater
benefits, because of the addition of the O.A.S.D.I. primary benefit, as well as the
spouse's benefit, if payable. This would make it easier to develop a plan for
compulsory retirement, if such is considered desirable.
6. Career Service Aspects of P.E.R.A. The adoption of a combination plan would
make early retirement less attractive; however, all present employees under a twopart system could retain membership in P.E.R.A. and retire prior to age 65 as at
present. The 20 year basis for maximum.retirement benefits at age 65 would remain
unchanged for current P.E.R.A. members.
The New Retirement Plan
In order to set up the new retirement plan it would be necessary to have
Colorado added to the list of dual retirement system states. Again, it is impor:tant
that this be done during the present session of Congress and that this session of
the 42nd General Assembly pass enabling legislation contingent upon the change in
the Social Security Act. Unless this is done, the O.A.S.D.I. coverar,e agreement
cannot be signed in time to backdate O.A.S.D.I. to January 1, 1956.
It would be possible to set up the new retirement plan after January 1, 1960,
even though O.A.S.D.I. coverage could not be backdated. If this were done, however,
any present employees who transferred to the new plan would suffer a loss in the
O.A.S.D.I. primary benefit, because of the lack of coverage between January 1, 1956,
and the signing of the coverage agreement. It would have no effect on the new
employees, who would automatically become members of the new retirement plan.
In either case, present employees would have the opportunity to decide in a
referendum whether to transfer from P.E.R.A. to the new retirement plan. F..arned
credits would not be frozen, and each present emplo;yee would have to determine
whether his expected benefits under the present plan would be greater than the
combined benefits under the new retirement plan, with credits already earned
recomputed according to the new plan formula.

.;:,

1. Accrued Unfunded Liability. The unfunded liability could be handled
in the same way as under P.E.R.A. or the other combined plans.
2. Employer's Share of Retirement Costs. As the new retirement plan is
based on 30 years' service at age 65, instead of 20, the employer's share of the
cost of each annuity would be decreased to approximately 55-60 per cent.

3. Lack of Coverage for Some Emplotees.

o.A.S.D.l. coverage for temporary

employees would dovetail with the new ret rement plan in the same way as with the

other combined plans.
4. '!he Three Cities. '!his problem could be handled in the same way as with
the other combined plans um.er a two-part retirement system.
5. Older Employees with Limited Coverage. The new retirement plan has the
same advantages for older employees with limited service as · the other combined plans.
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6. Career Service Aspects of P. E .R .A. The adoption of the new retirement
plan is one method of combination by which a career service retirement system can
be established. Retirement benefits would be geared to 30 years' service at age 65,
with additional benefits for years of service iri excess of 30. Even though 30
years is the standard, it is possible to get a substantial retirement benefit for
20 or 25 years' service at age 65, especially for those employees whose final
average salary is $4,800 or less. Early retirement would still be possible, but
would be discouraged because the monthly retirement benefit received would be the
actuarial equivalent of the benefit paid at age 65 for the same number of years
of service. An employee with 30 years' service who-retired at age 55 would
receive a monthly annuity approximately 47 per cent as large as he would have
received for the same number of years' service at age 65. If he retired at age
60, his monthly annuity would be approximately two-thirds as large as it would
have been at age 65 for the same number of years' service. When these earlyretirinP, employees reach age 65, O.A.S.D.I. benefits would be added, but the
new retirement plan annuity would remain the same.
·

